This article examines the Kantian ideas on motion in his work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In that essay, Kant holds that motion as a concept—from its connotation as elemental and fundamental predicament of the material reality—mobilises in matter all the characteristics of its essence as a property. Nevertheless conceiving motion as a concept does not enable us to confirm the existence of motion itself in the natural world because ‘the possibility of specific natural things can’t be discovered from their (...) mere concepts.’. Therefore, the concept of movement does not evidence the existence of the movement or its characteristics and properties. Such claim would imply that motion as a concept is not evidence of the existence of motion as such and, therefore, the properties of matter cannot be mobilised based on that concept because they are characteristics of the essence of motion. Then, how does Kant intend to denote motion? Why pretend to explain matter form the concept of motion if a pure concept is, by definition, independent of the data obtained from the sensibility?. Therefore, we will demonstrate that such weakness is the breaking point of the Kantian concept of motion in his “dynamic-metaphysical” model. (shrink)