Jürgen Habermas’s discourse-theoretic reconstruction of the normative foundations of democracy assumes the formal separation of democratic political practice from the economic system. Democratic autonomy presupposes a vital public sphere protected by a complex schedule of individual rights. These rights are supposed to secure the formal and material conditions for democratic freedom. However, because Habermas argues that the economy must be left to function according to endogenous market dynamics, he accepts as a condition of democracy (the formal separation of spheres) a (...) social structure that is in fact anti-democratic. The value of self-determination that Habermas’s theory of democracy presupposes is contradicted by the actual operations of capitalist markets. Further democratic development demands that the steering mechanisms of the capitalist market be challenged by self-organizing civic movements. (shrink)

Aunque el uso no problematizado en el lenguaje ordinario de los términos "consenso" y "consentimiento" sugiere que debe haber alguna comprensión compartida de su significado, no hay un acuerdo generalizado sobre el uso de estos conceptos entre los filósofos políticos. De hecho, el significado filosófico de estos conceptos sigue siendo elusivo y controvertido; tal vez precisamente a causa de su amplitud y centralidad. Teniendo en cuenta los numerosos intentos de explicar satisfactoriamente consenso y consentimiento -que con el tiempo se han (...) vuelto más sofisticados-, este artículo recoge algunos usos filosóficos fundamentales de estos dos multifacéticos conceptos y sugiere una estrategia para bosquejar un mapa que parece un rompecabezas cuyas piezas están moldeadas de tal forma que se necesita un enfoque multidisciplinario para poder identificar adecuadamente sus significados e implicaciones. Although the unproblematic use of the terms "consensus" and "consent" in ordinary language suggests that there must be some shared understanding of their meaning, there is no widespread assent on the use of these concepts among political philosophers. In fact, the philosophical meaning of these concepts remains elusive and controversial, perhaps exactly because of their extension and centrality. Taking note of the numerous attempts to provide a satisfactory account of "consensus" and "consent" - that have become increasingly sophisticated in time - this article recollects some fundamental philosophical uses of the two many-faceted concepts, and suggests a strategy for delineating a map that looks like a puzzle, whose pieces are shaped in such a way that we need a multidisciplinary approach in order to adequately identify their meanings and implications. (shrink)

This paper examines the properties of the validity and scope of arguments as standards for evaluating the epistemic qualities of particular deliberative exchanges within a context of value pluralism where parties can hold differing views of the common good based on incommensurable basic values. In this context, the task of political decisions is to maximise the interests of all, only judging between internally coherent versions of the common good on the basis of their mutual impact. The paper argues open, democratic, (...) deliberation provides the best chance of discovering such a path, through developing mutual understanding across incommensurable positions. Identifying the validity and scope of a deliberative exchange enhances this potential. Any deliberative exchange may be characterised in terms of its validity – the reasons that support its conclusions – and scope – the unquestioned assumptions that mark the boundaries of that reasoning. The paper explains the epistemic role of these two features in developing understanding across plural positions. Clarity about the validity of an exchange reveals positions that can be shared. Acknowledgement of its scope avoids over-extending its conclusions and reveals how positions differ, providing the starting point for further deliberation about their co-ordination. The paper ends by drawing the conclusion that deliberation characterised in this way should be democratic and open. (shrink)

If deliberative democracy is to be more than a critique of current practice and achieve the normative goals ascribed to it, its norms must be approximated in practice and combine its two elements, popular deliberation with democratic decision-making. In combining these, we come across a Weberian dilemma between legitimacy and effectiveness. One of the most popular methods for institutionalizing deliberative democracy, which has been suggested, is citizen associations in civil society. However, there has been a lack of precise and detailed (...) discussion about how such a system could link macro deliberations in public spheres with micro and formal decision-making arenas. This paper aims to amend this and offers a dualist model, which ensures that deliberation and decision-making are linked, and an effective balance between the Weberian dilemma is achieved, through the same secondary associations fulfilling both roles. The first part of this strategy focuses on the informal public sphere and its networks and their potential to foster deliberative communication between secondary associations and between these associations and the state that helps transform preferences and set the agenda for decision-making. The second part is mediating forums, organized by quangos, with devolved powers, where representatives from secondary associations assemble to make decisions based upon the norms of deliberative democracy. If deliberative democracy can be approximated in practice then it becomes a more persuasive theory as it means the normative goals attributed to it could actually be achieved, which is why the dualist method is significant. (shrink)

This dissertation addresses a debate about the proper relationship between democratic theory and institutions. The debate has been waged between two rival approaches: on the one side is an aggregative and economic theory of democracy, known as constitutional economics, and on the other side is deliberative democracy. The two sides endorse starkly different positions on the issue of what makes a democracy legitimate and stable within an institutional setting. Constitutional economists model political agents in the same way that neoclassical economists (...) model economic agents, that is, as self-regarding, rational maximizers; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and stability depend on the extent to which the design of institutional rules and practices maximize individual utility by promoting efficient schemes of collective choice. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, understand political agents as communicative reason-giving subjects who justify their preferences and positions on issues that jointly affect them in a process of consensus-directed discourse, or deliberation; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and order depend on the degree to which institutional norms and practices promote deliberation and draw upon deliberated public judgment. I argue that despite the numerous incompatibilities between constitutional economics and deliberative democracy—which amount to a 'deep divide'—an opportunity to produce a genuine synthesis of the two approaches arises inasmuch as it is possible to overcome several points of opposition in their separate research programmes. The central thesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to construct a bridge spanning the divide between constitutional economists and deliberative democrats, and that Dewey and Bentley's transactional view can facilitate this bridge-building project. Pursuant to this end, the points of opposition between the v research programmes are mediated by way of five concepts which, on balance, favor deliberative democracy and its feasible institutionalization. (shrink)