In this essay, I argue for a reinterpretation of F. H. Bradley's theory of feeling based on the underemphasized influence of Hegel's phenomenology on Bradley's philosophy. While traditional interpretations of Bradleyan feeling often understand it to have strong metaphysical connotations, I argue that such interpretations result in an important distortion of the overall structure of Bradley's thought. Contra the metaphysical interpretation, I argue that Bradley's account of feeling can only be properly understood by interpreting his theory in light of his (...) own explicit attributions of the theory to Hegel. By taking Bradley at his word that feeling truly is derived from Hegel, I argue that we are better able to understand the overall structure of Bradley's thought and the way in which he belongs to the neo-Hegelian tradition of philosophy. Through explaining the debt that Bradley owes to Hegel regarding feeling, an important source of disagreement between Bradley and Hegel will become apparent, namely, the ability for feeling to be subsumed within thought, thereby differentiating Bradley's and Hegel's ultimate characterizations of reality. (shrink)