In this paper, I defend a moderately cognitive account of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are interpreted as “worldview beliefs”, which I explicate as being indispensable to our everyday and scientific practice; my reading is nonetheless distinct from non-cognitivist readings of “worldview belief” which occasionally appear in the literature. I start with a brief analysis of a recent German contribution to the debate which on the one hand insists on the priority of epistemic reasons for or against religious beliefs, but on (...) the other hand contends that religious beliefs are worldview beliefs. This leads me to explicate a special sense of worldview beliefs, as well as their cognitive role. After that, I shed some light on a special epistemological characteristic of worldview beliefs, namely the strong involvement of “free certitude” in their acceptance. I explore the implications for the possible role of arguments for worldview beliefs, especially for worldview beliefs concerning theism. (shrink)

The Principle of Analogy. ABSTRACT. Sceptics question whether ‘distinctively human’ predicates such as ‘just’, ‘loving’ and ‘powerful’ can intelligibly be attributed to a divine being. If not, then a vicious form of agnosticism seems to threaten orthodox theism. Especially if one assumes a broadly empiricist semantics the challenge, whether formulated in terms of a univocal or an equivocal understanding of predicates, seems to generate intractable philosophical problems. Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication, understood either in terms of ‘analogy duorum ad tertium’ (...) or in terms of ‘analogy unus ad alterum’, is an influential response to this sceptical challenge. Difficulties in each understanding are explored and it is suggested that a more fruitful framework for understanding theistic language is to be found in late 20th century nativism of Fodor and Quine. (shrink)

The competence of moral sensitivity is increasingly regarded as key for the morality of people's social and professional behavior. However, specialized training strategies have yet to be developed. Training moral sensitivity through video games seems to be a particularly promising approach. This paper presents a research design for a strategic evaluation of numerous game mechanisms concerning their ability to support the development of moral sensitivity. In the first step, the competence of moral sensitivity is broken down into more concrete sub-competences (...) and learning outcomes, which shall be achieved. In the second step, a complementary framework for the strategic selection and implementation of suitable game mechanisms shall be designed. The present paper exemplarily introduces 15 training strategies, which effectively support the development of attitudes and values. Such validated strategies can aid the selection and design of relevant game mechanisms. Based on this framework, game mechanisms can be evaluated against their specific relevance for particular learning outcomes, and their general ability to realize relevant training strategies. Two game mechanisms are exemplarily evaluated in terms of their ability to foster the attitude of universalism, and their general ability to be used for the achievement of attitudinal learning outcomes. The overall framework shall enable a systematic evaluation of game mechanisms for the promotion of cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral learning outcomes linked to moral sensitivity. The framework will be transferable to the game-based training of other competences, though. (shrink)