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Probability and Causality

Philosophy of Science 57 (2):338-340 (1990)

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  1. When can statistical theories be causally closed?Balázs Gyenis & Miklós Rédei - 2002 - Foundations of Physics 34 (9):1285-1303.
    The notion of common cause closedness of a classical, Kolmogorovian probability space with respect to a causal independence relation between the random events is defined, and propositions are presented that characterize common cause closedness for specific probability spaces. It is proved in particular that no probability space with a finite number of random events can contain common causes of all the correlations it predicts; however, it is demonstrated that probability spaces even with a finite number of random events can be (...)
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  • Direct and indirect causes.Wolfgang Spohn - 1990 - Topoi 9 (2):125-145.
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  • (1 other version)Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanics.Mauricio Suárez - 2004 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3):271-300.
    In an influential article published in 1982, Bas Van Fraassen developed an argument against causal realism on the basis of an analysis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations of quantum mechanics. Several philosophers of science and experts in causal inference -including some causal realists like Wesley Salmon- have accepted Van Fraassen’s argument, interpreting it as a proof that the quantum correlations cannot be given any causal model. In this paper I argue that Van Fraassen’s article can also be interpreted as a good (...)
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  • A modest proposal for interpreting structural explanations.Mariam Thalos - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):279-295.
    Social sciences face a well-known problem, which is an instance of a general problem faced as well by psychological and biological sciences: the problem of establishing their legitimate existence alongside physics. This, as will become clear, is a problem in metaphysics. I will show how a new account of structural explanations, put forward by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, which is designed to solve this metaphysical problem with social sciences in mind, fails to treat the problem in any importantly new (...)
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