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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Hume's Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors
Hume Studies 18 (1):1-17 (1992)
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Pride is a fundamental element in Hume's description of human nature. An important part of the secondary literature on Hume is devoted to this passion. However, no one, as far as I am aware, takes seriously the fact that pride often appears in pairs with vanity. In Book 2 of the Treatise, pride is defined as the passion one feels when society recognizes his connection to a ‘cause’, composed by a ‘subject’ and a (positive) ‘quality’. Conversely, no definition of vanity (...) |
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Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions is one whose boundaries are not entirely clear. However, it is crucial to understanding his motivational theory and to identifying an unusual virtue he calls “strength of mind,” the motivational prevalence of the calm passions over the violent. In this paper, I investigate the boundaries of the calm passions and consider the constitution of strength of mind and why Hume regards it as an admirable trait. These are provocative issues for two reasons. (...) |
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Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings, including “the passions and other emotions.” These two terms for affective mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often treated by scholars as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former are the (...) |
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Without questioning Hutcheson's general affinities with the Stoics, this article focuses on two important differences in moral psychology that show the limits of the appropriation of Stoicism in Hutcheson's ethics of benevolence. First, Hutcheson's distinction between calm affections and violent passions does not fully match with the Stoic distinction between constantiæ and perturbationes, since the emotion of sorrow remains in Hutcheson's table of the calm affections. As far as sorrow as a public affection is concerned, this first point is tied (...) |
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Hume's explanation of our tendency to confuse calm passions with reason due to lack of feeling appears to present a tension with his claim that we cannot be mistaken about our own impressions. I argue that the calm/violent distinction cannot be understood in terms of presence/absence of feeling. Rather, for Hume the presence or absence of disruption and disordering of natural and/or customary modes of thought is the key distinction between the calm and violent passions. This reading provides new explanations (...) |
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In his Essays on the Active Powers, Thomas Reid criticises Hume 's theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that Reid shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings. |
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(2013). Hume's Theory of Pity and Malice. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 324-344. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.692664. |
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(1997). Hume's motivational distinction between natural and artificial virtues. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 373-388. |
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