Which harms and benefits should be viewed as relevant when considering whether to launch cyber-measures? In this article, we consider this question, which matters because it is central to determining whether cyber-measures should be launched. Several just war theorists hold a version of what we call the ‘Restrictive View’, according to which there are restrictions on the sorts of harms and benefits that should be included in proportionality assessments about the justifiability of going to war (whether cyber or kinetic). We (...) discuss two such views – the Just Cause Restrictive View and Rights-based Restrictive View – and find both wanting. By contrast, we defend what we call the ‘Permissive View’. This holds that all potential goods and bads should be included in proportionality decisions about cyber-measures, even those that appear to be trivial, and where the various harms and benefits are given different weights, according to their agent-relative and agent-neutral features. We argue further that accepting the Permissive View has broader implications for the ethical frameworks governing cyberwar, both in terms of whether cyberattack provide just cause for coercive responses, including kinetic warfare and cyber-responses, and whether cyber-measures should be governed by just war theory or a new theory for cyber-operations. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an escalation in cases of cyber violence, which has had a chilling effect on users' behavior toward social media sites. This article explores the causes behind cyber violence and provides empirical data for developing means for effective prevention. Using elements of the stimulus–organism–response theory, we constructed a model of cyber-violence behavior. A closed-ended questionnaire was administered to collect data through an online survey, which results in 531 valid responses. A proposed model was tested using (...) partial least squares structural equation modeling using SmartPLS 3.0, v. Research findings show that information inequality is a strong external stimulus with a significant positive impact on digital distrust and negative emotion. However, the effects of information overload on digital distrust and the adverse effects of communication overload on negative emotions should not be ignored. Both digital distrust and negative emotions have significant positive impacts on cyber violence and cumulatively represent 11.5% changes in cyber violence. Furthermore, information overload, communication overload, information inequality, and digital distrust show a 27.1% change in negative emotions. This study also presents evidence for competitive mediation of digital distrust by information overload, information inequality, and cyber violence. The results of this study have implications for individual practitioners and scholars, for organizations, and at the governmental level regarding cyber-violence behavior. To test our hypotheses, we have constructed an empirical, multidimensional model, including the role of specific mediators in creating relationships. (shrink)

Deterrence in cyberspace is possible. But it requires an effort to develop a new domain-specific, conceptual, normative, and strategic framework. To be successful, cyber deterrence needs to shift from threatening to prevailing. I argue that by itself, deterrence is insufficient to ensure stability of cyberspace. An international regime of norms regulating state behaviour in cyberspace is necessary to complement cyber deterrence strategies and foster stability. Enforcing this regime requires an authority able to ensure States compliance with the norms at an (...) international level, run investigations into suspected State-run cyber operations to define attribution, expose breaches of the norms, and impose adequate sanctions and punishments. These requirements define a political mandate for an authority that will have a deep impact on international relations and geo-political equilibriums. The UN Security Council has the necessary resources and the political and coercive power to meet these requirements. The time has come to embrace this power to consolidate and enforce an international regime of norms to regulate state behaviour in cyberspace. Problems, mistakes, and even failures are to be expected, but they must not hinder the process. (shrink)