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Natural Law: The Classical Theory

In Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford University Press (2002)

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  1. Legal positivism and the separation of existence and validity.Matthew Grellette - 2010 - Ratio Juris 23 (1):22-40.
    This paper centers upon the issue, within the project of analytic jurisprudence, of how to construe the status of the legal activities of a state when there is a disjuncture between a nation's formal legal commitments, such as those stated within a bill or charter of rights, and the way in which its officials actually engage in the practice of law, i.e., legislation and adjudication. Although there are two positions within contemporary legal theory which focus directly on this issue (Inclusive (...)
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  • Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):1-23.
    It is commonly said that some standards, such as morality, are ‘normatively authoritative’ in a way that other standards, such as etiquette, are not; standards like etiquette are said to be ‘not really normative’. Skeptics deny the very possibility of normative authority, and take claims like ‘etiquette is not really normative’ to be either empty or confused. I offer a different route to defeat skeptics about authority: instead of focusing on what makes standards like morality special, we should focus on (...)
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  • A Realist View of Hindu Law.Donald R. Davis - 2006 - Ratio Juris 19 (3):287-313.
    . Hindu law represents one of the least known, yet most sophisticated traditions of legal theory and jurisprudence in world history. Hindu jurisprudential texts contain elaborate and careful philosophical reflections on the nature of law and religion. The nature of Hindu law as a tradition has been subject to some debate and some misunderstanding both within and especially outside of specialist circles. The present essay utilizes the familiar framework of legal realism to describe the fundamental concepts of law and legal (...)
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  • Please Don't Use Science or Mathematics in Arguing for Human Rights or Natural Law.Alberto Artosi - 2010 - Ratio Juris 23 (3):311-332.
    In the vast literature on human rights and natural law one finds arguments that draw on science or mathematics to support claims to universality and objectivity. Here are two such arguments: 1) Human rights are as universal (i.e., valid independently of their specific historical and cultural Western origin) as the laws and theories of science; and 2) principles of natural law have the same objective (metahistorical) validity as mathematical principles. In what follows I will examine these arguments in some detail (...)
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  • Why Human Rights Are Called Human Rights.Alan Sussman - 2014 - Ethics and International Affairs 28 (2):171-182.
    The title of this essay is rather ambitious and the space available is hardly sufficient to examine two words of almost limitless expanse—“human rights”—whether standing alone or in tandem. This requires that I begin with (and remained disciplined by) what a teacher of mine, Leo Strauss, called “low facts.” My low facts are these: We call ourselves humans because we have certain characteristics that define our nature. We are social and political animals, as Aristotle noted, and possess attributes not shared (...)
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  • Injustice in robes: Iniquity and judicial accountability.Raymond Wacks - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (1):128-149.
    The paper addresses the question of judges' moral responsibility in an unjust society. How is the "moral" judge to reconcile his perception of justice with a malevolent law? Upon what grounds might judges, and perhaps other public officials, be held morally responsible for their acts or omissions? Does a positivist approach yield a more satisfactory resolution than a natural law or Dworkinian analysis? Could inclusive positivism offer any clues as to how this quandary might be judiciously resolved?
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  • (1 other version)The function of moral norms in the legal system: The Krausists’s restoration of the fundamental concepts of law.Delia Manzanero & José Vázquez Romero - 2011 - Human Affairs 21 (1):70-85.
    There are multiple and diverse voices of jurists who have expressed their fear of the unrestricted power of law enforcement and have announced the crisis of the formalist sense of Law. The widespread reaction against the abstract and formalist character of the positivist theory of law manifested itself as the Krausist philosophy of law and was backed by the philosophy of Krause, Schelling, Hegel and the most recent Natural Law theories that seek to establish substantial criteria for moral action. This (...)
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