С тех пор как был сформулирован новый способ прочтения Платона, осно- ванный на «неписаном учении», он стал предметом споров. Однако свидетель- ства его существования неоспоримы. Выражение Платона «неписаное учение» было использовано Аристотелем в «Физике», а описание этого учения можно найти как у Аристотеля, так и у других классических мыслителей. Есть три ключевых момента, имеющих решающее значение для «неписаного учения» Платона, т. е. его устных лекций, прочитанных в Академии, — это, во-первых, учение о принципах, т. е. о Едином и неопределенной Двоице, (...) во-вторых, тезис о геометрическом построении мира и, в-третьих, учение об идеальных числах. Эти числа упоминаются как в прямой, так и в косвенной традиции. Полемика по вопросу о «неписаном учении» возникла в немецких академических кругах, где интенсивное изучение Платона имеет давнюю и хорошо развитую тради- цию. В англосаксонском мире эта дискуссия, по-видимому, не была хорошо принята и иногда даже вызывала отвержение (особенно в кругу Г. Черниса и его последователей). Однако из этого, конечно, нельзя сделать вывод о том, что исследования, опирающиеся на «неписаное учение» Платона, не появи- лись в англоязычном мире, в котором также искали новые пути понимания смысла его философии. Сначала мы оценим различные прочтения, а также их аргументы относительно важности «неписаного учения» для реконструкции философии Платона, а затем аргументируем свою позицию в этих дискуссиях. (shrink)

This paper takes a detailed look at the Republic’s Divided Line analogy and considers how we should respond to its most contentious implication: that pistis and dianoia have the same degree of ‘clarity’ (σαφήνεια). It argues that we must take this implication at face value and that doing so allows us to better understand both the analogy and the nature of dianoia.

Corrective intervention in Plato's metaphysics replacing the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with a novel and revolutionary paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity.

The paper argues that Plato’s dialogue form creates a Quinean “opaque context” that segregates the assertions by Plato’s characters in the dialogues from both Plato and the real world with the result that the dialogues require a hermeneutical interpretation. Sec. I argues that since the assertions in the dialogues are located inside an opaque context, the forms of life of the characters in the dialogues acquires primary philosophical importance for Plato. The second section argues that the thesis of Sec. I (...) coheres with the claim in Plato’s Seventh Letter that since philosophical truth is incommunicable by means of language it is of primary importance for philosophers to develop proper “schemes of living”. Sec. III argues since the forms of life of the characters portrayed in the dialogues is of primary philosophical importance for Plato, and since hermeneutical methods are required to interpret emerging forms of life, Plato’s dialogues are positively crafted to be read hermeneutically. Sec IV argues that Heidegger, who is famous for seeing Plato’s views as antithetical to his own hermeneutical approach, is mistaken, and that Plato’s real views are, in principle, more akin to Heidegger’s views than he thinks. (shrink)

Philosophy has four forms: wonder, faith, doubt and scepticism. These are not separate categories, but separate ideal possibilities. Modern academic philosophy has fallen, for several centuries, into an error: which is the error of supposing that philosophy is only what I call doubt. Philosophy may be doubt: indeed, it is part of my argument that this is undeniably one element of, or one possibility in, philosophy; but doubt is only one of four points of the compass. In this essay I (...) indicate the nature of each point of the compass as it has been found in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

With the late Author’s kind permission, the present text is published here in a somewhat abbreviated and modified translation that has been given appropriate subheadings and supplemented with an extensive bibliography. Its German original from 1996 has been translated into French and English. The purpose of the present translation is to make the Polish reader acquainted with the important and innovative account of Plato’s philosophy that has been put forward by the Tübingen School whose one of the most prominent co-founders (...) was Hans Joachim Krämer. While this text is devoted to Plato’s critique of writing, it also presents Plato’s agrapha dogmata as an important supplement to the written dialogues. A fuller overview of the major assumptions of this new interpretation is to be found in the recently published Gesammelte Ansätze zu Platon. (shrink)

In the 'Hippias Major' Socrates uses a counter-example to oppose Hippias‘s view that parts and wholes always have a "continuous" nature. Socrates argues, for example, that even-numbered groups might be made of parts with the opposite character, i.e. odd. As Gadamer has shown, Socrates often uses such examples as a model for understanding language and definitions: numbers and definitions both draw disparate elements into a sum-whole differing from the parts. In this paper I follow Gadamer‘s suggestion that we should focus (...) on the parallel between numbers and definitions in Platonic thought. However, I offer a different interpretation of the lesson implicit in Socrates‘s opposition to Hippias. I argue that, according to Socrates, parts and sum-wholes may share in essential attributes; yet this unity or continuity is neither necessary, as Hippias suggests, nor is it impossible, as Gadamer implies. In closing, I suggest that this seemingly minor difference in logical interpretation has important implications for how we should understand the structure of human communities in a Platonic context. (shrink)

This article offers a Polish translation of Aristotle’s treatise, On Philosophy, of which only certain fragments and testimonies have been preserved. The translation is supplied with an introduction presenting the history of various interpretations and reconstructions of Aristotle’s work.

Resumen En el presente artículo se explora la pertenencia de los libros M y N al programa general de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. Los libros XIII y XIV han quedado en el trasfondo de la Metafísica, como una suerte de agregado editorial, del cual se puede prescindir para la comprensión de la propuesta aristotélica. En el presente artículo, sin embargo, se asume un punto de partida diferente, que consiste en integrar estos libros al núcleo de la propuesta de la Metafísica, (...) enten diendo que ellos son claves para completar el panorama de la teoría general de la sustancia, o ousiología, que guía todos los libros metafísicos. De este modo, la discusión de M y N sobre números y principios viene a concluir la cuestión de la sustancia como causa y principio, anunciada desde el inicio de la Metafísica y desarrollada en sus libros centrales.This article explores the belonging of books M and N to the generalprogram of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Books XIII and XIV have remained in the background of Metaphysics, as a kind of editorial aggregate, which can be dispensed with for the understanding of the Aristotelian proposal. In this article, however, a different startingpoint is assumed, which consists in integrating these books into the core of the proposal of Metaphysics, understanding that they are key to completing the panorama of the general theory of substance, or ousiology, which guides all metaphysical books. Thus, the discussion of numbers and principles within M and N concludes the question of substance as cause and principle, announced from the beginning of Metaphysics and developed in its central books. (shrink)