My intention is not to get into specific, detailed historical observation about the ways that led the term ‘democracy’ to take on its current meaning, in science as much as in politics, but rather to establish a comparison between the models that political science proposes and interprets as important for the existence of democracy and those that science illustrates as indicators of scientific knowledge constructed in a democratic form. The debate about the contemporary meaning of democracy has generated an extraordinary (...) diversification of models of democracy: from technocratic conceptions of government to conceptions of social life that include widespread political participation. And it is exactly for this reason that the assumption of a specific point of view on the question we are dealing with inevitably brings with it the choice of a model suitable to describe democratic form as a form of politics without further explanation, that is, as a political system with which science measures itself as a cultural category. In this sense, we can consider the passage from the concept of democracy to that of politics and generally of science to be a peaceful one, since politics has been appointed with that set of behaviours and democratic practices (including science) that political culture demands for the social benefit. This demand can be met only on condition that structural obstacles are removed and new cultural and epistemological mediators are introduced. (shrink)

Fuller describes the place of intellectuals in the modern world—as researchers, teachers, academics, and citizens. Their job is that of developing and promoting ideas. He explains their failure to perform well and offers advice: say what you think you should say, not necessarily what you think. The advice is unsuitable; it is aimed at advisers and expert witnesses, not at intellectuals. Also, his analysis invites proposals for social reforms aimed at lowering traditional expectations of intellectuals and toward presenting them with (...) clearer and fairer job descriptions instead. (shrink)

In reviewing Finocchiaro's book, I argue that Galileo deserved to be found guilty for the charges against him. A measure of Finocchiaro's scrupulously fair-minded presentation of the issues surrounding the Galileo Affair is the fact that a contrary case against his own exculpatory evaluation may be inferred from his meticulous scholarship. Specifically, to acknowledge that the standards of evaluation and judgment have changed since 1633 is not in any way to diminish Galileo's greatness but, on the contrary, to recognize his (...) visionary insights. Even to acknowledge that he was justly condemned by standards that we no longer accept in science or theology is not to detract from his deserved place in the firmament of scientific genius. (shrink)

This volume presents a selection of papers reflecting key theoretical issues in argumentation theory. Its six sections are devoted to specific themes, including the analysis and evaluation of argumentation, argument schemes and the contextual embedding of argumentation. The section on general perspectives on argumentation discusses the trends of empiricalization, contextualization and formalization, offers descriptions of the analytical and evaluative tools of informal logic, and highlights selected principles that argumentation theorists do and do not agree upon. In turn, the section on (...) linguistic approaches to argumentation focuses on the problem of distinguishing between explanation and argument, while also elaborating on the role of verbal indicators of argument schemes. All essays included in this volume point out notable recent developments in the study of argumentation. (shrink)

Relativism is often motivated in terms of certain types of disagreement. In this paper, we survey the philosophical debates over two such types: faultless disagreement in the case of gustatory conflict, and fundamental disagreement in the case of epistemic conflict. Each of the two discussions makes use of a implicit conception of judgement: brute judgement in the case of faultless disagreement, and rule-governed judgement in the case of fundamental disagreement. We show that the prevalent accounts work with unreasonably high levels (...) of idealization. We defend two claims. First, philosophical discussions of disagreement need to be de-idealized. Second, once a less idealized account of disagreement is available, both our conception of judgement and our understanding of relativism need to be revised. Our example is a case study in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s classic Leviathan and the Air-Pump. This case study gives a less idealized account of disagreement that conceptualizes judgements as situated. We argue that this conception can and should be applied to cases of gustatory and epistemic disagreement. The payoff will be a reformulation of relativism in terms of rationally resolvable yet contingent disagreements. (shrink)

How do Dutch people let each other know that they disagree? What do they say when they want to resolve their difference of opinion by way of an argumentative discussion? In what way do they convey that they are convinced by each other’s argumentation? How do they criticize each other’s argumentative moves? Which words and expressions do they use in these endeavors? By answering these questions this short essay provides a brief inventory of the language of argumentation in Dutch.

As documented in Part I, monogenism, the descent of all human beings from Adam and Eve, was closely linked to the Catholic doctrine of original sin throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Theological reservations about polygenism, the more scientifically supported account of human origins through a transitional population, was brought to a head by Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani generis. Although the encyclical allowed discussion of human evolution, polygenism was prohibited because “It does not appear how such a (...) view can be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin.” Nevertheless, during and after Vatican II de facto theological acceptance of polygenism became commonplace even though the prohibition was not withdrawn. While some modern conceptions of original sin make a reliance upon monogenism unnecessary, another school of thought emphasizes a spiritual rather than a biological understanding of the concept. It remains to be seen whether polygenism can be unanimously accepted as a scientific phenomenon that is not theologically threatening. Reflection on the Vatican’s long period of ambivalence about the motion of the earth suggests that a similar prospect can be foreseen for polygenism even though it is subject to development in a manner that geostasis was not. (shrink)

Theological attention to the Catholic doctrine of original sin has a history that extends from the letters of Saint Paul through the Council of Trent and Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical, Humani generis. The doctrine has traditionally been articulated through the Genesis narrative of Adam and Eve as the first human beings from whom all others descend, an account known as monogenism. In the course of the nineteenth century, scientific research into human origins increasingly relied upon polygenism, the descent of humanity (...) from non-human ancestors through a transitional population. Subsequent Catholic engagement with evolution included resistance to polygenism from the Vatican due to a perceived conflict with the doctrine of original sin. Humani generis included a prohibition that remains in place today in spite of widespread de facto acceptance of polygenism among theologians. Understanding the origin and persistence of this disparity stands to benefit from comparison to a corresponding ambivalence toward the sixteenth century Copernican hypothesis of a moving earth, only conclusively resolved in 1992. In Part I of this essay I introduce this historical comparison and describe the origins of monogenism and polygenism terminology in nineteenth century debate over the unity of the human race. I then describe the conceptual changes that transpired during the first half of the twentieth century and the resulting role of polygenism in the nouvelle théologie of the decade prior to Humani generis. Subsequent developments and implications follow in Part II. (shrink)