I sometimes wonder whether some proponents of physician-assisted suicide or physician-assisted death think they own the copyright to such catchy phrases as “death with dignity” and “a good death” so that if you are against PAS or PAD, thenyou must be againsta dignified death or a good death. If one removes the quotation marks around phrases like “aid-in-dying” or “compassionate care for the dying,” I am not opposed to such end-of-life care either. Indeed, how couldanybodybe against this type of care?I (...) do not want to abandon dying patients anymore than Dr. Timothy Quill does. Although, unfortunately, it will not always be easy to achieve the desired result, I agree with him that it ought to be a goal of medicine “to help people die well, to help them receive a good death” — or at least “the best possible” death under the circumstances. I part company with Professor Quill, however, when he urges us to change the law in the majority of our states so that in some circumstances patients may achieve a “good death” or a “dignified” one by means of lethal drugs. (shrink)

Supporting the rational suicide of a patient with a terminal disease is opposed by a majority of German doctors, whereas assistance in such patients’ hastening their death by voluntarily stopping eating and drinking is predominantly judged to be acceptable. Are these two positions compatible? It is argued that the normative differentiation cannot be justified by the fact that the assistance in active suicide is itself active, whereas assistance in VSED is merely passive. Even in "letting die" a patient from hastening (...) death by refusing nutrition and hydration there is an active element in the doctor's/the palliative care team's assurance that they will provide palliative support in case of need. Nor can the difference in evaluation be justified by relevant differences in the causal situation. Enabling a patient to perform VSED and assisting a patient's active suicide under the same circumstances are, as far as causal relevance is concerned, on a par. This holds, at least, on a condition view of causality in the tradition of John Stuart Mill. Finally, the paper discusses whether there are other morally relevant dimensions by which actively and passively supporting a patient suicide under the relevant circumstances differ, again with a negative result. (shrink)

The problem of physician-assisted death, assisted suicide and active euthanasia, has been debated predominantly in the ethically familiar vocabulary of rights, duties, and consequences. Patient autonomy and the right to die with dignity vie with the duty of physicians to heal, but not to kill, and the specter of “the slippery slope” from voluntary euthanasia as a last resort for patients suffering from terminal illness to PAD on demand and mercy killing of “hopeless” incompetent patients. Another dimension of the debate (...) over PAD concerns the evaluative question of what constitutes a good death. At stake are Issues of character and virtue in the face of death and dying and their Implications for legitimizing the practice of PAD. Critics of PAD argue that “natural” death in the context of comfort care, as provided by hospice programs, is the good death. In contrast, PAD amounts to an easy way out, an evasion of the ultimate human challenge and task of dying. Because hospice care is clearly preferable to PAD, the former should be encouraged and the latter remain prohibited. (shrink)

Outcomes from cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) remain distressingly poor. Overuse of CPR is attributable to unrealistic expectations, unintended consequences of existing policies and failure to honour patient refusal of CPR. We analyzed the CPR outcomes literature using the bioethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice and developed a proposal for selective use of CPR. Beneficence supports use of CPR when most effective. Non-maleficence argues against performing CPR when the outcomes are harmful or usage inappropriate. Additionally, policies which usurp good clinical (...) judgment and moral responsibility, thereby contributing to inappropriate CPR usage, should be considered maleficent. Autonomy restricts CPR use when refused but cannot create a right to CPR. Justice requires that we define which medical interventions contribute sufficiently to health and happiness that they should be made universally available. This ordering is necessary whether one believes in the utilitarian standard or wishes medical care to be universally available on fairness grounds. Low-yield CPR fails justice criteria. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be performed when justified by the extensive outcomes literature; not performed when not desired by the patient or not indicated; and performed infrequently when relatively contraindicated. (shrink)

Sometimes one’s greatest academic disappointments can have unexpected outcomes. This is especially true when one is trying to change career trajectories or do something that others did not take seriously. My path into neuroethics was an unexpected journey catalyzed in part by constructive disappointment and the disbelief of colleagues who thought that the work I was pursuing nearly two decades prior was a fool’s errand. After all, could anyone—in his or her right mind—ever conceive of waking up a person unconscious (...) from brain injury and getting him to speak?1. (shrink)

While pain is common among seniors, it is not adequately treated or managed. In particular, pain in seniors with dementia is often undertreated and undermanaged. Although the undertreatment of pain among persons with cognitive impairments represents a serious ethical concern for pain clinicians, most writers in the area explain the undertreatment of pain by focusing on issues related to liability, fears of addiction to opioids, and erroneous beliefs that pain is a normal part of the ageing process. We argue that (...) the philosophical notion of personhood must also be given careful attention when considering the problem of pain undermanagement. In this paper, we consider the undertreatment of pain among seniors with dementia, while focusing on the ontology of relationships and on existential philosophy. Moreover, we outline a series of recommendations to help minimize the probability of pain undertreatment in this population and to encourage considerations relating to personhood when treating people with dementia. (shrink)

The Stoics considered that in order to die well, one must previously have lived (well) and not merely existed, an assertion which will not be contested in this paper. The question raised here is whether an individual whose life expectancy is jeopardized by serious illness or whose life has not been lived to the ‘full’ for whatever reason should have to abandon all hope or, alternately, whether that life could still somehow be saved (in an ethical sense). One clear obstacle (...) to achieving this stems from (bad) moral character, given that moral character is an element which conditions an individual’s moral behaviour, as pointed out by Beauchamp and Childress and particularly Pellegrino and Thomasma. The transformation of moral character requires time and effort but the testimonies of patients who have given their lives a radical new direction upon being diagnosed with a serious illness seem to show the existence of a peculiar phenomenon of moral catharsis. In this paper we attempt to illustrate that this alleged phenomenon is not the result of a kind of cataleptic impression but rather the result of a dialectic and narrative process, during which a first hope of healing is dashed, unveiling a new sense in the illness. Its fulfillment provides the patient with a final hope. (shrink)

In this article, I sort through some of the confusion surrounding what constitutes the controversial notion of a “good death” for children. I distinguish, first, between metaphysical and practical disagreements about the notion of a good death, and, second, between accounts of a good death that minimally and maximally promote the dying child’s interests. I propose a narrowed account of the dying child’s interests, because they differ from the interests of non-dying children. Importantly, this account illustrates how disagreements at the (...) end of a child’s life are sometimes the result of a shift from a future to a present-oriented understanding of the child’s interests on the part of some stakeholders but not others, and sometimes the result of a values-based disagreement about how different interests should be weighted. This brings into sharper focus the questions of for whom, and in what way, a child’s death might be considered good. (shrink)

Despite significant advances in medicine, death remains a certainty for every living human being. End-of-life care decision-making is not made easier in a multi-cultural and multi-religious society like Malaysia. As such, planning for one's death by making Advance Decisions can be immensely valuable as it can help healthcare providers in Malaysia to understand better the preferences and wishes of their patients. However, compared to other countries, there is currently no specific legislation on any form of Advance Decisions in Malaysia despite (...) many doctors voicing a need for them. Unlike the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in the UK, the Malaysian Mental Health Act 2001 does not cover all instances of incapacity and only applies to those who suffer from a mental disorder as defined in the Act. In the absence of legislation, one could look to ethical guidelines, especially from the Malaysian Medical Council, but find that this can sometimes be problematic. It is argued that a concerted effort involving all relevant parties is required to develop a pragmatic and viable Advance Decisions frameworkl in Malaysia. (shrink)