A variety of world models have influenced psychological inquiry. However, recent theoretical analyses of the field have argued that the lack of a single metatheoretical framework in which to base psychological inquiry may have severe negative consequences. In this paper I review three distinctive world views which have influenced psychological inquiry and develop the idea that, at least at this point in the history of psychology, the use of multiple metatheoretical perspectives may be beneficial. Specifically, I suggest that using various (...) metatheoretical views may minimize the perpetuation of limited systems and develop a point of view for thinking about metatheoretical pluralism from several philosophical/intellectual traditions. Moreover, I argue that acknowledging the viability and utility of multiple metatheoretical perspectives does not necessarily resign psychology to perpetual disunification or fragmentation. (shrink)

The present work is immersed in the context of the contemporary philosophy of science, especially of the semanticist philosophy of the structuralist metatheory. Objectively, the work aims to reestablish the dialogue between the general philosophy of science and the special philosophy developed by scientists concerned with the fundamentals of their discipline, in this case, with sociologists. After presenting the Mertonian notion of middle range theory, the conception of theory that offers ME and, from that conception, a way of conceiving both (...) global intertheoretical relations and intertheoretical change will be presented. Finally, the analysis of the use of the notion of middle range theory in scientific practice will be made, analyzing the specific case of sociological research about organizations. (shrink)

This manuscript brings the early writings of M.M. Bakhtin to the contemporary concern over pluralist ethics. Generally, I argue that many ethical quandaries which individuals face cannot be ascribed to a plurality of ethics or a social indeterminacy of morals. I maintain that human valuation, as an ethics of action always already in play, refers to existing individuals'' struggles to participate in their personally proclaimed and endorsed value systems. Thus, I draw upon Bakhtin to suggest that concrete acts of valuation (...) (ethics in everyday practice) are not reducible to theoretically agreed upon ethical systems, but rather, they are inseparable from the emotional-volitional moments within the total context of my uniquely held existence. (shrink)