“Morality is relative to culture” is a descriptive claim; many people in many different cultures have different moral beliefs. When one adopts moral relativism, however, the claim accrues a normative dimension, in that what follows from relativity is the flattening out of rightness, of one moral belief being better than another regardless of culture. But in practice, humans rarely, if ever, actually behave as if certain things or beliefs are not better than others, as evidenced in everything from foreign policy (...) to religion to consumption choices. This leads to a problem of consistency: either the relativist does not act in accordance with her beliefs or her beliefs are different from what she espouses. Or so a.. (shrink)

In this paper, I make the case that the tradition of pragmatism may usefully inform aesthetic criticism. To that end, I contrast the anti-essentialist outlook and the ethico-political concerns of neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty with the epistemological underpinnings of analytic aesthetics. The aim is to outline an alternative meta-theoretical perspective that ‘overwrites’ long-standing concerns with exactitude and objectivity. Drawing on examples from my own area of expertise, film, and television studies, I seek to explicitly set up aesthetic criticism, especially evaluation, (...) as a means of social progress and human flourishing within the framework of liberal democracy. (shrink)

It is generally assumed, without argument, that legal theory, legal philosophy, philosophy of law, and jurisprudence all mean the same thing. This paper rejects that assumption, and in particular the assumption that jurisprudence is the same thing as legal philosophy. This assumption has recently been challenged by Roger Cotterrell in his article “Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy,” and I seek to build on his arguments by adding insights found in the work of Stanley Fish.