Legal scholars and theorists have recently drawn a more sustained attention to the link between international human rights law (hereafter IHRL) and international criminal law (hereafter ICL). This concerns both positive and more normative accounts of the link. Whether positive or normative, the predominant approach to constructing the link issubstantive. This overlap is normatively justified in similar terms by reference to a subset of moral human rights. In this paper, I offer an alternative to the substantive approach. After identifying two (...) flaws in the substantive approach (the problem ofthresholdand the problem ofethical neutrality), I defend what I call astructuralaccount by focusing on duty‐holders. I start by reconstructing two structural characteristics common to IHRL and ICLquainternational legal regimes: who has theauthorityto address violations of IHRL and ICL, and who can beliablefor those violations. I then infer thatpublic authority(functionally construed) constitutes the common structural core of IHRL and ICL. I rely on the extraterritorial application of IHRL and on the collective dimension of ICL violations to further support the argument. I finally offer an argument explaining the normative point of those structural features. I hold that IHRL and ICL (their adjudicative and liability regimes) are both necessary (but clearly not sufficient) to render this exercise of public authority legitimate to its subjects. (shrink)