Next SectionIt is commonly proposed that artifacts cannot be understood without reference to human intentions. This fact, I contend, has relevance to the use of artifacts in intentional action. I argue that because artifacts have intentions embedded into them antecedently, when we use artifacts we are sometimes compelled to intend descriptions of our actions that we might, for various reasons, be inclined to believe that we do not intend. I focus this argument to a specific set of artifacts, namely, medical (...) devices, before considering an extended application to emergency contraceptive devices. Although there is some debate about whether emergency contraception has an abortifacient effect, I argue that if there is an abortifacient effect, then the effect cannot normally be a side effect of one’s action. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the doctrine of double effect is disposed toward abuse. I try to identify two distinct sources of abuse of double effect: the conditions associated with standard formulations of double effect and the difficulty of fully understanding one’s own intentions in action. Both of these sources of abuse are exacerbated in complex circumstances, where double effect is most often employed. I raise this concern about abuse not as a criticism of double effect but rather as (...) a problem that defenders should observe and try to prevent. I go on to suggest certain methods for avoiding the abuse of double effect such as hesitating to use it, applying it only with other agents, and selectively and carefully propagating it. (shrink)