In the Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously retracts his account of personal identity by confessing that it involves a profound problem he cannot solve, which I have elsewhere identified and called the Bundling Problem. Neither of the two possible solutions that Hume himself considers in the Appendix is a viable option for him by his own lights, which might suggest that any successful account of a unified self must go beyond the empirical framework. In this paper, (...) I argue that we can find a strictly empiricist solution to Hume's problem in William James. I attempt to show that James's descriptions of our experience are phenomenologically more detailed and faithful to how experience is undergone from the first-person perspective, which allows him to explain our belief in an identical, unified self solely on empirical grounds. James finds unity and continuity right in the content of the stream of experience itself. A detailed investigation of James's accounts reveals that Hume's fundamental problem does not stem merely from his lack of empirical resources but, more importantly, from his tacit abandonment of the professed empiricist methodology. (shrink)

In the 19th century, "Psychophysical Parallelism" was the most popular solution of the mind-body problem among physiologists, psychologists and philosophers. (This is not to be mixed up with Leibnizian and other cases of "Cartesian" parallelism.) The fate of this non-Cartesian view, as founded by Gustav Theodor Fechner, is reviewed. It is shown that Feigl's "identity theory" eventually goes back to Alois Riehl who promoted a hybrid version of psychophysical parallelism and Kantian mind-body theory which was taken up by Feigl's teacher (...) Moritz Schlick. (shrink)

Our goal is to investigate the notion of self-agency in William James and Donald Winnicott. With James, we examine the descriptive element of what constitutes a self. With Winnicott, we explore his explanatory theory on self-emergence. Winnicott's perspective is presented here as the prehistory of the Jamesian self. James's conception of self is similar to the Winnicottian notion of an "integrated self", an embodied position that emerges from the organism's actions in the experiential field. The combination of the two approaches (...) leads to the idea that the self is a flux of identities emerging in interaction with others in the "transitional space" (an intermediate area of experience). (shrink)

The dissertation explores William James's conception of the self and his belief in the possibility of immortality. In The Divided Self of William James, James scholar Richard M. Gale argues that James unwittingly advanced two incompatible types of selves: a self-assertive "Promethean" self who maximizes desire-satisfaction and a passive mystic self who favors conceptless, mystical intuition. I argue that Gale's dichotomy of James is incorrect and that James's conception of the self is better understood through his growing belief in the (...) possibility of immortality. I develop this idea by considering relevant aspects of both James's personal and philosophical development. I discuss the personal crises of James's youth as well as the dilemmas he encountered as his philosophy evolved. I argue that one of the keys to understanding James's conception of the self was his long-term involvement with psychic research and his association with the psychic medium Leonora Piper. These interactions compelled James to envision possibilities for the self beyond this life. In the final analysis, I believe my alternative account to Gale results in a more accurate and unified understanding of James, i.e., one in which the possibility of immortality played a central role in James's evolving vision of the self. (shrink)