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  1. Limitarianism, Upper Limits, and Minimal Thresholds.Dick Timmer - forthcoming - Res Publica:1-19.
    Limitarianism holds that there is an upper limit to how many resources, such as wealth and income, people can permissibly have. In this article, I examine the conceptual structure of limitarianism. I focus on the upper limit and the idea that resources above the limit are ‘excess resources’. I distinguish two possible limitarian views about such resources: (i) that excess resources have zero moral value for the holder; and (ii) that excess resources do have moral value for the holder but (...)
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  • Limitarismo presuntivo. Una respuesta a Robert Huseby.Dick Timmer - 2024 - In Ingrid Robeyns (ed.), Tener Demasiado: Ensayos Filosóficos sobre el Limitarismo. Open Book Publishers. pp. 227–244. Translated by Héctor Iñaki Larrínaga Márquez.
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  • Must We Always Pursue Economic Growth?Jeffrey Carroll - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):102-110.
    Must we always pursue economic growth? Kogelmann answers yes. Not only should poor countries pursue growth, but rich countries should as well. Kogelmann aims to provide a wealth-insensitive argument – one demonstrating all countries should pursue growth regardless of their wealth. His central argument – the no halting growth (NHG) argument – says no country experiencing growth should stop it, because doing so requires undermining the conditions causing it and those conditions are independently morally desirable, so they should not be (...)
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  • Presumptive Limitarianism: A Reply to Robert Huseby.Dick Timmer - 2023 - In Ingrid Robeyns (ed.), Having Too Much: Philosophical Essays on Limitarianism. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. pp. 203-218.
    In earlier work on limitarianism, I argued that setting an upper limit to the amount of wealth that people can permissibly have is justified when decision-makers are unaware of or disagree about the appropriate distributive criterion or if they are unaware of people’s relevant features (or both). Robert Huseby has raised several powerful objections to this presumptive argument for limitarianism. Some of these objections call for a revision of my defence of presumptive limitarianism while others call for clarification, both of (...)
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