The soul-making theodicy seeks to explain how belief in the existence of God is compatible with the evil, pain and suffering we experience in our world. It purports to meet the problem of evil posed by non-theists by articulating a divine plan in which the occurrence of evil is necessary for enabling the greater good of character building of free moral agents. Many philosophers of religion have levelled strong objections against this theodicy. In this essay, Leslie Allan considers the effectiveness (...) of the counterarguments advanced by theist philosopher, Clement Dore, to two key objections to the soul-making theodicy. (shrink)

In this paper, I reply to Markus Arnold’s comment and Amanda Bryant’s comment on my work “Can Kuhn’s Taxonomic Incommensurability be an Image of Science?” in Moti Mizrahi’s edited collection, The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation?. Philosophers and scientists are social epistemic agents. As such, they ought to behave in accordance with epistemic norms governing the behavior of social epistemic agents.

Selgelid and Koplin’s article ‘Kidney Sales and the Burden of Proof’ (K&S 2019) presents a series of detailed and persuasive arguments, intended to demolish my own arguments against the prohibition of organ selling. And perhaps they might succeed, if the case described by the authors were anything like the one I actually make. However, notwithstanding the extensive quotations and the detailed explanations of the way I supposedly argue, this account of my position comprehensively mistakes both the conclusions I reach and (...) the arguments I give for them. -/- I know that there are around many misconceptions about my views on this subject, but I have always hoped they could not survive a reading of what I had actually written. I have just—after a gap of many years—looked again at the two most recent of the texts Koplin and Selgelid refer to, and it goes without saying that I can see various things I could now do better; but I do still find these misinterpretations hard to understand. And since anyone with nothing to go on but this article would reasonably conclude that the original texts were not worth reading, I am grateful to the editors for the opportunity to try to set the record straight. -/- I presume not many readers would be interested in a detailed comparative commentary on the texts, showing where this account gets my intentions wrong. I shall try instead to explain how what I do mean—and what I think I say—diverges from what is said here, and then go on to a brief outline of what my arguments and conclusions really are. I hope this may also give some sense of why, for all the opposition I have encountered since I was first drawn into this debate, I persist in thinking that the work I have been doing is important not only for this topic but for analysis in practical ethics more generally. (shrink)

The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. By means of discussing the vexatious problem of phenomenal qualities, he explores how the debate may be advanced by seeing each dualist and monist ontology through the lens of an evolutionary epistemology. The author suggests that by regarding each ontology as the core of a (...) scientific research programme, each of these logically irrefutable hypotheses can be tested rationally. (shrink)

El análisis de los conceptos de espacio y tiempo es generalmente considerado uno de los aspectos menos satisfactorios de la obra de Hume. Kemp Smith ha demostrado que en esta sección del Tratado Hume estaba respondiendo a los argumentos que Pierre Bayle había utilizado para probar que el razonamiento humano siempre termina refutándose a sí mismo. En este ensayo expongo las falacias en los argumentos de Bayle, las cuales están basadas en una comprensión inadecuada del concepto de extensión. Hume no (...) logró detectar dichas falacias y repitió los mismos errores de Bayle, lo cual explica la absurda doctrina del espacio que defiende en el Tratado. (shrink)

The focus of this article is René Descartes’ bold claim that his method as presented in the Discourse on Method, will revolutionize science as well as philosophy. The author of this article reviews each chapter of the Discourse trying to establish what exactly Descartes had in mind and if he delivered what he had promised. The findings of the article are disappointing. Descartes skillfully uses rhetorical techniques to win his audience and to gain publicity, yet in fact he proposes no (...) more than just four rules of conducting research inserted in chapter II. The remaining five chapters are either loosely connected with the main theme (chapters I and IV) or are entirely off the topic (chapters III, V and VI). Chapter IV, probably the most famous in the Discourse because of its cogito ergo sum principle, also has little in common with Descartes’ pledge. The author concludes that if there is anything worthy in the Discourse, it is its adolescent boldness and challenge to the establishment of Descartes’ time. If, however, we take his Discourse at face value, then we must conclude that Descartes fails to fulfill his promise and engages mainly in self-promotion. (shrink)

Author: Świeżyński Adam Title: PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLE AS AN “EXTRAORDINARY EVENT” (Filozoficzna analiza pojęcia cudu jako „zdarzenia niezwykłego”) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 939-962 Keywords: CONCEPT OF MIRACLE, THEISM, SUPERNATURAL EVENT, NATURAL SCIENCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:It has been common for some time to think of a miracle as a special, extraordinary event possessing a supernatural cause. Such a supernaturalistic account of (...) miracles might be constructed with an eye to apologetic concerns, in the hope that the occurrence of a miracle might provide a defense for theism. The general strategy of such an apologetic appeal is to suggest that a miracle is an event that nature could not produce on its own. It is thought of as an event that is incapable of receiving a natural explanation. Thus the supernaturalist hopes that the occurrence of a miracle will point to the operation of a causal force from outside of nature, i.e. one that is supernatural. The miracle as an “extraordinary event” can be understood in two ways: (1) as a supernatural event and (2) as an event inexplicable by natural sciences. I will seek to show that in (1) we can talk about a supernatural event as a miraculous one only when we mean the fact that it is caused by a supernatural cause (God) and not when we mean that the very event (the way it proceeds) is supernatural. And with respect to (2), I suggest that talking about scientific inexplicability of a miraculous event doesn’t make sense because it results from understanding the miracle as a violation of the laws of nature and that cannot be proven (and there is no need to do it). My concern is to show the difficulties of such an account of miracles, and to show how our concept of the miraculous could do without it. (shrink)