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We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients. Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian argument, we conclude that we can (...) |
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Biomedical interventions, such as pharmacological and neurological interventions, are increasingly being offered or considered for offer to offenders in the criminal justice system as a means of reducing recidivism and achieving offender rehabilitation through treatment. An offender’s consent to treatment may affect decisions about diversion from the criminal justice system, sentence or parole, and so hope for a preferable treatment in the criminal justice system may influence the offender’s consent. This thematic analysis of three focus group interviews conducted in Canada (...) |
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The paper critically discusses the moral view that neurotechnological behavioural treatment for criminal offenders should only be offered if it is in their best interests. First, I show that it is difficult to apply and assess the notion of the offender's best interests unless one has a clear idea of what ‘best interests’ means. Second, I argue that if one accepts that harmful punishment of offenders has a place in the criminal justice system, it seems inconsistent not to accept the (...) |
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The paper critically discusses the moral view that neurotechnological behavioural treatment for criminal offenders should only be offered if it is in their best interests. First, I show that it is difficult to apply and assess the notion of the offender's best interests unless one has a clear idea of what ‘best interests’ means. Second, I argue that if one accepts that harmful punishment of offenders has a place in the criminal justice system, it seems inconsistent not to accept the (...) |
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In the last decade, a series of acts of violence has increased the interest in understanding what prompts individuals to engage in serial killing, bombing, and other violent acts. The shootings of Columbine, Newtown, and Aurora in the United States, and of Oslo in Norway, 9/11, and the recent bombing during the Boston Marathon have raised questions of how to thwart such tragedies as well as of how to detect and possibly “control” individuals posing a threat to public safety. In (...) |
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The important question of the legality of the state obliging trial incompetent defendants to receive competency-restoring treatment against their wishes, is one that has received much attention by legal scholars. Surprisingly, however, little attention has been paid to the, in many ways more fundamental, moral question of whether the state ought to administer such treatments. The aim of this paper is to start filling this gap in the literature. I begin by offering some reasons for thinking it morally acceptable to, (...) |
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In this paper, I discuss whether it is ever morally permissible to diminish the cognitive abilities or capacities of some cognitively gifted offenders whose ability to commit their crimes successfully relies on them possessing these abilities or capacities. I suggest that, given such cognitive diminishments may prevent such offenders from re-offending and causing others considerable harm, this provides us with at least one good moral reason in favour of employing them. After setting out more clearly what cognitive diminishment may consist (...) |
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Moral agential neuroenhancement can transform us into better people. However, critics of MB raise four central objections to MANEs use: It destroys moral freedom; it kills one moral agent and replaces them with another, better agent; it carries significant risk of infection and illness; it benefits society but not the enhanced person; and it’s wrong to experiment on nonconsenting persons. Herein, I defend MANE’s use for prisoners of war fighting unjustly. First, the permissibility of killing unjust combatants entails that, in (...) |
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Derk Pereboom (2014) argues that human beings do not have the kind of free will required for moral responsibility. Pereboom argues that we should use a system of incarceration for criminal offenders based on a quarantine analogy. Patients in quarantine scenarios are not responsible for their sickness, are separated from society because of the danger they pose, and are prepared for release as soon as possible. By analogy, criminal offenders should also be separated from society and rehabilitated to prepare them (...) |
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