An investigation into what kind of knowledge is necessary for interpretation is an important research project for the two fields of the theory of meaning and epistemology, through which they are combined. By examining the two basic requirements for a theory on the interpretation of language drafted by Donald Davidson, this paper analyzes several kinds of knowledge which are necessary for interpretation. The goal is to explore the knowledge of radical interpretation and the distinctions and connections between this knowledge and (...) radical translation and Convention-T, thus revealing its characteristics and possibility to interpretation. (shrink)

Following Quine, Davidson, and Dennett, I take mental states and linguistic meaning to be individuated with reference to interpretation. The regulative principle of ideal interpretation is to maximize rationality, and this accounts for the distinctiveness and autonomy of the vocabulary of agency. This rationality-maxim can accommodate empirical cognitive-psychological investigation into the nature and limitations of human mental processing. Interpretivism is explicitly anti-reductionist, but in the context of Rorty's neo-pragmatism provides a naturalized view of agents. The interpretivist strategy affords a less (...) despondent view of constructive philosophical activity than Rorty's own. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es problematizar las críticas que hacen Fodor y Lepore en Holism: a shopper’s guide a la teoría holista propuesta por Donald Davidson. Para hacerlo, primero se hará una exposición de la teoría davidsoniana y se expondrán tres de las críticas hechas por Fodor y Lepore: la composicionalidad es necesaria para evitar los enunciados-W; la condición epistemológica de un intérprete radical es problemática; el principio de caridad no tiene ningún uso en la teoría del significado, entonces (...) no se puede derivar una conclusión holista de este principio. Una vez claras las críticas de Fodor y Lepore, se argumentará por qué no tienen un fundamento fuerte y se señalarán alguno problemas que quedan por resolver. (shrink)

Which is the relation between logic and philosophy of mind? This work tries to answer that question by shortly examining, first, the place that is assigned to logic in three current views of the mind: Computationalism, Interpretativism and Naive Naturalism. Secondly, the classical debate between psychologism and antipsychologism is reviewed -the question about whether logic is or not a part of psychology- and it is indicated in which place of such debate the three mentioned conceptions of mind are located.