- Epistemic repugnance four ways.Brian Talbot - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3001-3022.details
|
|
Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.details
|
|
Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):71-87.details
|
|
Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.details
|
|
(1 other version)Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.details
|
|
(1 other version)BonJour’s ‘Basic Antifoundationalist Argument’ and the Doctrine of the Given.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.details
|
|
Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism.J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.details
|
|
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.details
|
|
Foundationalism, coherentism, and the levels gambit.David Shatz - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.details
|
|
Kenosis, omniscience, and the Anselmian concept of divinity.Joel Archer - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):201-213.details
|
|
Infinte Regress Arguments.Claude Gratton - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
|
|
A quintet, a quartet, a trio, a duo? The epistemic regress problem, evidential support, and skepticism.Timo Kajamies - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):525-534.details
|
|
Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):175-185.details
|
|