Recently, both evolutionary anthropologists and some philosophers have argued that cooperative social settings unique to humans play an important role in the development of both our cognitive capacities and what Michael Tomasello terms the “construction” of “normative rationality” or “a normative point of view as a self-regulating mechanism.” In this article, I use evolutionary game theory to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that cooperation fosters epistemic rationality. Employing an extension of signal-receiver games that I term “telephone games,” I show (...) that cooperative contexts work as advertised: under plausible conditions, these scenarios favor epistemically rational agents over irrational ones designed to do just as well as them in non-interactive contexts. I then show that the basic results are strengthened by introducing complications that make the game more realistic. (shrink)

Biological market theory has in recent years become an important part of the social evolutionist’s toolkit. This article discusses the explanatory potential and pitfalls of biological market theory in the context of big picture accounts of the evolution of human cooperation and morality. I begin by assessing an influential account that presents biological market dynamics as a key driver of the evolution of fairness norms in humans. I argue that this account is problematic for theoretical, empirical, and conceptual reasons. After (...) mapping the evidential and explanatory limits of biological market theory, I suggest that it can nevertheless fill a lacuna in an alternative account of hominin evolution. Trade on a biological marketplace can help explain why norm-based cooperation did not break down when our late-Pleistocene ancestors entered new, challenging social and economic environments. (shrink)

In this article, I demonstrate two ways in which our major theories of the evolution of cooperation may fail to capture particular social phenomena. The first shortcoming of our current major theories stems from the possibility of mischaracterizing the cooperative problem in game theory. The second shortcoming of our current major theories is the insensitivity of these explanatory models to ecological and genomic context. As a case study to illustrate these points, I will use the cooperative interaction of a species (...) of myxobacteria called Myxococcus xanthus. M. xanthus cooperate in many areas of their life cycle—in quorum sensing, social motility, fruiting body formation, and predation. I focus in particular on predation as we have not yet discovered an adequate explanation of how they sustain cooperative predation in the face of developmental cheats. In explaining why we have not, I draw generalizable conclusions that shed light on our use of simplified models to explain real-world behaviors in a variety of organisms. (shrink)