In this essay I offer a qualified defence of Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretical critique of reification. This defence begins by engaging with a cross-section of the recent critical responses to Honneth's theory. In response to these criticisms I develop a reading of the recognition-theoretical critique of reification which illuminates both the intentional structure and pre-ethical nature of affective recognition whilst also reconstructing the existential contours of reification, understood as the “forgetfulness of recognition.” The paper concludes by taking the problem of “forgetfulness” (...) in a novel direction by drawing on the theory of double reflection expounded by Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In this final discussion I argue that the recognition-theoretical application of the theory of double reflection provides a conceptual model which allows one to think through the social, cultural and political mediations which inhibit, or wholly.. (shrink)