There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...) nor endorsed by Plato in his Republic, there is a more complex version of Rational Egoism to which Plato is indeed committed. Moreover, such a conception of practical rationality is not vulnerable to the standard set of objections that contemporary philosophers have made against Rational Egoism. (shrink)

There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...) nor endorsed by Plato in his Republic, there is a more complex version of Rational Egoism to which Plato is indeed committed. Moreover, such a conception of practical rationality is not vulnerable to the standard set of objections that contemporary philosophers have made against Rational Egoism. (shrink)

Glaucon's Challenge at the beginning of Book 2 of Plato's Republic has long prompted interpretive difficulties, due to a misunderstanding of its central aspect. The task of this essay is to correct...

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é investigar a justificativa para o contrato no início da história do pensamento político grego, tendo em vista o estatuto do acordo no livro II da "República" de Platão. Pretendese avaliar como Glaucon apresenta o contratualismo da maioria das pessoas como um desdobramento da tese de Trasímaco de que o justo é o vantajoso para o mais forte e em conexão com os valores que levam as pessoas a admitirem a necessidade do contrato em razão (...) do medo que elas possuem daquilo que poderia ser considerado o maior mal: sofrerem injustiças e não poderem se vingar, enquanto abdicam do que consideram como o maior bem: cometer injustiças sem serem punidas. ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to investigate the justification for the contract in the early history of the Greek political thought, focusing on the statute of the agreement in book II of Plato's "Republic". It is intended to evaluate how Glaucon presents the contractualism of the majority of people in connection with Thrasymachus's thesis that the fair is what's advantageous for the strongest and in connection with the values that lead people to admit the necessity of the contract because of fear that they have about what could be considered as the greatest evil: suffering injustice and being unable to take revenge while they abdicate what they see as the greatest good: doing injustice without being punished. (shrink)