Defining “criticism” is a simple—but bedeviling—task. No less a critic and theorist than Edwin Black begins with the simple statement that “criticism is what critics do.” While he admits that this seems like an empty definition, Black does note that it has one redeeming feature—“It compels us to focus on the critic” (1978, 4). Criticism and those who engage in it are integrally connected, and any account of critical activity must deal with both the activity and its actor. In this (...) way, it is much like art—one could easily utter that “art is what artists do.” Criticism is often tied to art and its products, so this appears to be a fair way to proceed in an investigation of criticism. Yet I would argue .. (shrink)

Foucault's preoccupation with the visual, specifically his positing of a sort of ‘positive unconscious of vision’, offers an entry point for examining data generated through a field study of home‐care case management practice. In Foucault's work, our attention is directed not so much to what is seen but to what can be seen and to the effects of practices of knowledge and power in constituting these particular realities. Knowledge emerges as a matter of what it is possible for knowers, for (...) nurses, to see and to say, as well as the conditions that constitute these specific possibilities for seeing and saying in a given context. Given the significance of practices of seeing in case management – seeing clients, seeing situations – examining how possibilities for understanding are constituted through ways of seeing helps us to ‘see’ the limits of currently possible practice. In the case examined in this paper, these limits constitute a gap between what a client may actually need and what it is possible, in the context of current practice, to provide. To change practice it seems important, if only as a first step, to recognize the constraints of thought in what we see. (shrink)

Intentional communities are formed by a group of people who have voluntarily chosen to live together for a range of reasons in the creation of a shared lifestyle. They concern practical forms of living that may reflect diverse structures and distinct philosophies. The intentional community literature is both broad and unique in its representation of intentional community living. Intentional communities may also be considered sites that form the basis for resisting mainstream forms of living and representations of subjectivity. Through an (...) active process of self-constitution, participants engaged in communal forms of living may construct different identities and styles of life. Although the term ‘intentional community’ is fairly recent, notions of utopian living have a long history. Forms of utopian living can be found in early biblical times, while Foucault’s domain of ‘ethics’ is also derived from what the intentional community literature considers to be early utopian communities. Despite an extensive literature, very little research explicitly focuses on communal living as a form of ethics as praxis. This may be due to the characterisation of ethics as a form of rules, duties and consequences, rather than ethics as a relationship that a person cultivates with their ‘self’. Foucault’s domain of ethics provides a valuable context to explore whether intentional community living can be theorised as a Foucauldian form of ethics. Although there is contemporary interest in Foucault’s domain of ethics, relatively few texts have sought to use Foucault’s ethical conceptualisation as a qualitative methodology in the context of empirical research. Even fewer studies have drawn on Foucault’s theoretical framework in the context of empirical research on intentional communities. This is despite a number of themes that the literature shares concerning notions of resistance, identity as a form of selfconstitution and the potentially transformative effect of communal living. This research therefore seeks to make a significant contribution to a relatively underresearched and under-theorised area of the literature. Drawing on Foucault’s ethics as a theoretical framework, this thesis explores twenty-eight narratives of participants who live on five rural communities in northern NSW, Australia. Fieldwork was conducted over a nine-month period between 2004 and 2005, with periods of time spent on each community. One community was revisited for the purpose of collecting further empirical data. Foucault’s ethical analysis and Foucauldian constructionism are used in the analysis and interpretation of the interviews that resulted from this fieldwork. Where individual interviews were not undertaken, a document analysis of former empirical research serves to affirm participant observations. Ethical issues concerning confidentiality and representation were addressed through the attendance at communal or ‘tribal’ meetings where required. The findings suggest that intentional community living may be theorised as a Foucauldian form of ethics, with an analysis of the empirical research providing further insight into each of the four aspects of Foucault’s ethics: the ethical substance, the mode of subjection, the self-forming activities and the telos. The findings also indicate that communal, or co-operative, living may reflect the dominant form of ethics for intentional community members by the way it permeates all other aspects of ethics. In this light, it can be said that intentional community living is an ethics as praxis—a truly practical philosophy. The implications of these findings suggest that through their very practice of an ethics, intentional community participants may be ethical, or ‘individualising’, subjects. That is, through notions of personal choice, acts of resistance and the performance of practices on the self that effect transformation, participants may construct both a ‘self’ and ‘styles of life’ that they both like and affirm, thereby positioning themselves differently against mainstream representations of ‘suburbia’. (shrink)

Colleges and universities exist within a political arena where external demands for accountability materialize within a market-driven environment. As a result, government agencies pressure colleges and universities to rely on assessment and transparent reporting to become more market-driven assuming that the competition within the market, led by public choice and institutional selection, will drive improvements in learning and will also self-govern the institutions. This article explores how Foucault informs our conception of neoliberal governmentality through political rationality and technologies of self-governance (...) in order to inform our understanding of accountability in higher education and to challenge institutions to develop a counter dialogue which meets institutional obligations to the public and market. (shrink)

Today, nearly two years after Wexler and Sullivan’s (2023) article was first published, the crucial questions discussed therein are all the more pertinent and troubling. The advent of novel interve...

This paper is a written version of a talk given at the 19th International Philosophy of Nursing conference to honour the contributions of Dr. John S. Drummond, nurse and philosopher, to an ongoing and collective project we could call ‘thinking nursing’. Over the course of his career, John Drummond published a series of essays, building on his reading of the works of continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Lyotard or Deleuze, that draw us to nursing as a matter of concern, and (...) that through their incisive analyses, help us to pay attention to the changes that are going on with nursing now. Though this essay began as a way to mark the death of John Drummond, and to pay tribute to his work, we also find that our return to his texts is like other experiences of return – the pleasure of experiencing something anew, as if for the first time. (shrink)

In a provocative recent study, Bent Flyvbjerg makes a sustained case for the need for a revitalized conception of social inquiry with direct input into the policy-making and planning process, contending that it is only in this way that social science can be made to matter again. Flyvbjerg further contends that to do justice to the reality of contemporary policy forums, we need to embrace a thoroughgoing dialogical conception of the policy-making process itself. To vindicate this contention and theoretically ground (...) the envisaged dialogical ideal, Flyvbjerg draws extensively on the work of both Habermas and Foucault. In so doing, he makes a valuable contribution to delineating the requirements that contemporary policy forums must meet if participants can judiciously claim to be engaging in decision-making in the best interests of the community at large. However, the overall tenability of Flyvbjerg’s proposal is diminished because, motivated by his convictions about the importance of power relations in determining real-world policy outcomes, he engages in a one-sided defence of the merits of Foucault’s contribution to the neglect of Habermas’s input in informing us about the ground rules needed to structure policy debate to ensure an equitable outcome. The aim of the present article is to redress this imbalance. To this end, I argue that given certain weaknesses in Foucault’s formulation of his position, we must draw on Habermas as a corrective if we are to succeed in advancing the dialogical ideal envisaged by Flyvbjerg. Beyond defending the need for a complementary reading of these theorists, I undertake to facilitate the implementation of the envisaged dialogical ideal by further elucidating the discursive conditions needed to underpin it. (shrink)