A recent clinical literature on the psychology of cosmetic surgery patients is concerned with distinguishing good from bad candidates. Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) — a mental disorder marked by a pathological aversion to some aspect(s) of one’s appearance — is typically understood in this context as a contra-indication for cosmetic surgery, as it marks those with inappropriate motivation who are unlikely to be satisfied by the surgery’s outcomes. This article uses Foucault’s genealogical work to argue that both the attempt to (...) provide diagnostic conditions for BDD itself, and the broader attempt to demarcate normal and psychopathological concern with appearance are, in part, effects of disciplinary power. Although often presented as a way of making cosmetic surgery more ethical and restrained, this epistemic project inadvertently defends cosmetic surgical interests. Specifically, it contributes to legitimizing the image of an ethically suspect sub-specialty of medicine, and supports its commercial expansion and effective profit-making by displacing its negative sequelae onto patient psyches. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that promoting patient values is a legitimate goal of medicine. Our view offers a justification for certain current practices, including birth control and living organ donation, that are widely accepted but do not fit neatly within the most common extant accounts of the goals of medicine. Moreover, we argue that recognising value promotion as a goal of medicine will expand the scope of medical practice by including some procedures that are sometimes rejected as being outside (...) the scope of acceptable medical practice, such as certain forms of physician-assisted death. We then rebut some common and possible objections to this view. Our aim is not to argue that other accounts are mistaken—except when they argue for a single goal that does not include patient values—but rather to show that value promotion should play a more central role in discussions about the goals of medicine. (shrink)

Physicians frequently ask whether they should give patients what they want, usually when there are considerations pointing against doing so, such as medicine’s values and physicians’ obligations. It has been argued that the source of medicine’s values and physicians’ obligations lies in what has been dubbed “the internal morality of medicine”: medicine is a practice with an end and norms that are definitive of this practice and that determine what physicians ought to do qua physicians. In this paper, I defend (...) the claim that medicine requires a morality that is internal to its practice, while rejecting the prevalent characterization of this morality and offering an alternative one. My approach to the internal morality of medicine is constructivist in nature: the norms of medicine are constructed by medical professionals, other professionals, and patients, given medicine’s end of “benefitting patients in need of prima facie medical treatment and care.” I make the case that patients should be involved in the construction of medicine’s morality not only because they have knowledge that is relevant to the internal morality of medicine—namely, their own values and preferences—but also because medicine is an inherently relational enterprise: in medicine the relationship between physician and patient is a constitutive component of the craft itself. The framework I propose provides an authoritative morality for medicine, while allowing for the incorporation, into that very morality, of qualified deference to patient values. (shrink)

Recent criticisms of medicine converge on fundamental questions about the aim of medicine. The main task of this paper is to propose an account of the aim of medicine. Discussing and rejecting the initially plausible proposal according to which medicine is pathocentric, the paper presents and defends the Autonomy Thesis, which holds that medicine is not pathocentric, but sanocentric, aiming to promote health with the final aim to enhance autonomy. The paper closes by considering the objection that the Autonomy Thesis (...) is overly permissive and allows many highly controversial procedures as legitimate parts of medicine. (shrink)

Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology.While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh questions and new insights into old debates. In addition, the broader (...) purview offered by social epistemology opens up opportunities to address new topics such as the role of consensus conferences, epistemic injustice, the value of medical knowledge, continuing medical education, and industry funding. This article situates and summarizes the contributions to this special issue. (shrink)

Immer mehr Menschen unterziehen sich chirurgischen Eingriffen, um ihr äußeres Erscheinungsbild zu verändern. Angesichts der omnipräsenten Konfrontation mit medial vermittelten Schönheitsstandards stellt sich die Frage des selbstbestimmten Umgangs mit den zur Verfügung stehenden Techniken der kosmetischen Chirurgie. Dieser Aufsatz analysiert die Frage, ob (und in welchem Sinne) die Inanspruchnahme schönheitschirurgischer Maßnahmen als Ausdruck einer autonomen Entscheidung von Individuen betrachtet werden kann, oder ob sich entsprechende Körpereingriffe vielmehr dem Diktat von moralisch fragwürdigen Normen äußerer Erscheinungen verdanken und damit Ausdruck des zunehmenden (...) Konformitätsdrucks und der Unterwerfung des Individuums unter soziale Standards sind. Im Ergebnis wird gezeigt, dass ein subjektivistisches Autonomieverständnis für eine normative Bewertung schönheitschirurgischer Körpereingriffe unangemessen ist und anschließend ein Autonomiekonzept skizziert, das Bedingungen dafür formuliert, welche Formen der Nötigung als autonomiebeschränkend gelten können. (shrink)

Using medical advances to enhance human athletic, aesthetic, and cognitive performance, rather than to treat disease, has been controversial. Little is known about physicians? experiences, views, and attitudes in this regard. We surveyed a national sample of physicians to determine how often they prescribe enhancements, their views on using medicine for enhancement, and whether they would be willing to prescribe a series of potential interventions that might be considered enhancements. We find that many physicians occasionally prescribe enhancements, but doctors hold (...) nuanced and ambiguous views of these issues. Most express concerns about the potential effects of enhancements on social equity, yet many also believe specific enhancements that are safe and effective should be available but not covered by insurance. These apparently contradictory views might reflect inherent tensions between the values of equity and liberty, which could make crafting coherent social policies on medical enhancements challenging. [Supplementary materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of American Journal of Bioethics for the following free supplemental resource(s): An additional table (Table 5) referred to on p. 5]. (shrink)

In response to physicians who refuse to provide medical services that are contrary to their ethical and/or religious beliefs, it is sometimes asserted that anyone who is not willing to provide legally and professionally permitted medical services should choose another profession. This article critically examines the underlying assumption that conscientious objection is incompatible with a physician’s professional obligations (the “incompatibility thesis”). Several accounts of the professional obligations of physicians are explored: general ethical theories (consequentialism, contractarianism, and rights-based theories), internal morality (...) (essentialist and non-essentialist conceptions), reciprocal justice, social contract, and promising. It is argued that none of these accounts of a physician’s professional obligations unequivocally supports the incompatibility thesis. (shrink)

Implant ethics is defined here as the study of ethical aspects of the lasting introduction of technological devices into the human body. Whereas technological implants relieve us of some of the ethical problems connected with transplantation, other difficulties arise that are in need of careful analysis. A systematic approach to implant ethics is proposed. The major specific problems are identified as those concerning end of life issues (turning off devices), enhancement of human capabilities beyond normal levels, mental changes and personal (...) identity, and cultural effects. (shrink)

Principlism is an ethical framework that has dominated bioethical discourse for the past 50 years. There are differing perspectives on its proper scope and limits. In this article, we consider to what extent principlism provides guidance for the abortion and euthanasia debates. We argue that whilst principlism may be considered a useful framework for structuring bioethical discourse, it does not in itself allow for the resolution of these neuralgic policy discussions. Scholars have attempted to use principlism to analyse the ethics (...) and legality of abortion and euthanasia; but such efforts are methodologically problematic. We close with a consideration of the proper scope of principlism in bioethics–a vision that is more modest than the manner in which principlism is often deployed in contemporary academic bioethics and medical education. (shrink)

Recent controversial cases of killings by police have generated competing Black Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter movements. Blue Lives Matter proponents claim that the focus on and protests in light of police killings of unarmed black persons is unwarranted. Part of this dispute turns on the moral evaluation of the killing of citizens by law enforcement. To address the dispute, I develop an account of the special moral obligations of law enforcement and show how it can be applied. I (...) argue that members of law enforcement have special moral obligations against killing citizens. The account generates moral guidance for law enforcement in a number of other ways. It implies, finally, that the Blue Lives Matter proponents fundamentally misunderstand the ethics of law enforcement. (shrink)

*The opinions expressed are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the National Institutes of Health, the Public Health Service, or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

ZusammenfassungImmer mehr Menschen unterziehen sich chirurgischen Eingriffen, um ihr äußeres Erscheinungsbild zu verändern. Angesichts der omnipräsenten Konfrontation mit medial vermittelten Schönheitsstandards stellt sich die Frage des selbstbestimmten Umgangs mit den zur Verfügung stehenden Techniken der kosmetischen Chirurgie. Dieser Aufsatz analysiert die Frage, ob die Inanspruchnahme schönheitschirurgischer Maßnahmen als Ausdruck einer autonomen Entscheidung von Individuen betrachtet werden kann, oder ob sich entsprechende Körpereingriffe vielmehr dem Diktat von moralisch fragwürdigen Normen äußerer Erscheinungen verdanken und damit Ausdruck des zunehmenden Konformitätsdrucks und der Unterwerfung (...) des Individuums unter soziale Standards sind. Im Ergebnis wird gezeigt, dass ein subjektivistisches Autonomieverständnis für eine normative Bewertung schönheitschirurgischer Körpereingriffe unangemessen ist und anschließend ein Autonomiekonzept skizziert, das Bedingungen dafür formuliert, welche Formen der Nötigung als autonomiebeschränkend gelten können. (shrink)

The principle of autonomy is widely recognized to be of utmost importance in bioethics; however, we argue that this principle is often misapplied when one fails to distinguish two different contexts in medicine. When a particular patient is offered treatment options, she has the ultimate say in whether to proceed with any of those treatments. However, when deciding whether a particular intervention should be regarded as a form of medical treatment in the first place, it is the medical community who (...) has the ultimate say. Some argue that particular interventions should be allowed by virtue of the fact that they are autonomously requested. But making such an argument fails to distinguish between these two contexts and misapplies the principle of autonomy, ultimately having the potential to instigate problematic changes in the practice of medicine. (shrink)

:Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations about the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have been sky high. These expectations have gone largely unfulfilled. But though the dream of being able to control our biology is still far off, gene editing research has made enormous strides toward potential clinical use. This paper argues that when it comes to determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical context—germline intervention in reproductive medicine—issues (...) about enhancement and eugenics are, for the foreseeable future, a red herring. Current translational goals for gene editing research involve a different kind of editing than would be required to achieve manipulation of complex traits such as intelligence, and there are more pressing questions that need attention if clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility. (shrink)