This thesis philosophically examines, critically discusses, and proposes how a plausible philosophical framework of consciousness and free will should be formulated. This framework takes into account contemporary scientific research on human consciousness and free will and its possible challenges; also it is examined how this framework should be related to theistic beliefs – especially those connected to human and divine consciousness and free will. First, an overview of important research within the natural sciences about the conscious mind is presented together (...) with its challenges to a theistic worldview. Next, questions related to reductive physicalism and dualism as a thesis and an antithesis are discussed. This dialectical approach leads to two lines for possible alternatives: emergence theories and process panpsychism. The subsequent analysis suggests that a form of process panpsychism in combination with a weaker form of emergence is most plausible. After a discussion of some central ideas about determinism and indeterminism, together with a brief overview of standard arguments within the philosophical free will debate, the proposed emergent process panpsychism is related to these standard arguments in the free will debate and scientific research about decision-making. As a result it will be suggested how free will should be understood in relation to the emergent process panpsychism. The consequences of these results are then discussed in relation to a theistic worldview. Here panentheism will be suggested as the most reasonable conception of God. Also, the consequences for divine consciousness, divine action and interaction, the human soul, life before birth and after death, and more briefly a personal relationship with God, theological determinism, omniscience, and omnipotence will be discussed specifically in relation to panentheism in an emergent process panpsychist setting. (shrink)

Daniel Ott and I are reenacting and extending a debate that took place in the early 1980s between the third-generation Chicago schoolers Bernard Loomer and Bernard Meland.1 Their quarrel concerned the “size” of God and the accompanying question of divine ambiguity.After a brief examination of the Loomer-Meland debate, this article explores and commends the religious qualities of pantheistic God metaphors—what I will call “the spirituality of size.” Clearly, then, I tend to side with Loomer in “the battle of the Bernards.” (...) Be that as it may, I end up holding out for a polytheistic pantheism that effectively merges a Loomerian aesthetics with a Melandian axiology, a pantheist metaphysics of ultimacy with a pluralist... (shrink)