The article presents an original needs-based partial theory of human injustice and shows its relationship to existing theories of human need and human liberation. The theory is based on an original typology of three social structural sources of human injustice, a partial theorization of the mechanisms of human injustice, and a needs-based theorization of the nature of human injustice, as experienced by individuals. The article makes a sociological contribution to normative social theory by clarifying the relationship of human injustice to (...) human needs, human rights, and human liberation. The theory contends that human injustice is produced when oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation create systematic inequality in opportunities to address human needs, leading to wrongful need deprivation and the resulting serious harm. In one longer sentence, this needs-based partial theory of the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three distinct social systemic sources—oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation—produce unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms, which create systematic inequality in opportunities to address universal human needs in culturally specific ways, thus producing the nature of the human injustice theorized here: wrongfully unmet needs and serious harm. (shrink)

“The re-discovery of Marx,” Marcello Musto argues, “is based on his persistent capacity to explain the present: he remains an indispensible instrument for understanding it and transforming it.”. It is true that the continuity of problems connecting our world to Marx’s ensures the relevance of historical materialism. At the same time, changes in the structure and scale of capitalism, as well as failures of nineteenth and twentieth century socialism to build a democratic and life-affirming alternative, force twenty-first century socialists to (...) risk new theoretical and practical departures. Yet, nowhere is a consistent ethical-political-economic foundation for twenty-first century socialism fully spelled out. The aim of this paper is to provide the missing foundations of a democratic and ecological socialism in the idea of life-value and the principle of life-coherence developed in the work of John McMurtry. (shrink)

This paper is a review essay of two collections of essays focused on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. The review focuses on three core themes. First, it discusses those papers that explore the central role that the relationship between practices and institutions plays in MacIntyre’s critique of modernity. Second, it turns to those papers that examine the foundational role that human needs play in MacIntyre’s ethics. Third, it places in dialogue those papers that defend MacIntyre’s politics as a form of (...) ‘revolutionary Aristotelianism’ with those that contest the soundness of this categorization. (shrink)

Marx's comments on Hegel's philosophy have left an ambiguous legacy for Marxism. One pervasive theme, though, is the interpretation of Hegel's idealist philosophy as being shrouded in mysticism. Marx's main contribution, according to this view, was to demystify Hegel's thought through a more materialist dialectical approach. At the same time, however, there have been those who have sought to rupture this Hegel-Marx connection and purge Hegelianism from Marxism altogether. Appropriate and expunge have therefore been the two main responses to Hegel's (...) influence on Marxism. I will argue against these traditions, however, to assert a more direct relationship between Hegel's and Marx's dialectic. To do so, I want to identify some of the main Marxist thinkers that can be linked with the two main schools above. I will term these the Hegelian-Marxist Materialist Appropriators and the Idealist Expungers. In contrast I put forward the Hegelian-Marxist Materialist school which states that ultimately the dialectic of Hegel is the dialectic of Marx. Before this, I begin by considering some examples of Marx's critique of Hegel. The leitmotif of this critique is a depiction of Hegel's dialectic as mystical or idealistic in contrast to Marx's more materialist dialectic. As we shall see, such a criticism was begun by Marx, perpetuated by Engels as ‘orthodox’ Marxism and ultimately accepted even by those who sought to place themselves within an Hegelian-Marxist tradition. (shrink)

This conceptual paper presents a radical humanist framing of the relationship between human needs and social welfare. It draws and develops its conceptualisation of radical humanism from the early philosophical writings of Marx in which he identified the radical constitutive needs of the human species. It seeks to translate the definitive characteristics of humanity's ‘species being’ – namely consciousness, ‘work’, sociality and historical development – into overarching claims or social rights to autonomous thinking, creative activity, mutual caring and human progress. (...) It argues for a ‘needs-first ethos’ from within which critically to evaluate welfare policy and practice, and through which to conceptualise approaches that humanise rather than dehumanise. (shrink)

All varieties of socialism share this trait in common: they are systematic alternatives to capitalism. But why should a systematic alternative to capitalism be necessary? Has it not proven to be the most productive economic system in history? Has it not created social conditions in which the powers of human imagination, creativity, and scientific understanding have grown to wider scope than in any previous society? Has it not enabled human beings to extend their life span and live healthier and more (...) active lives than ever before? Has it not proven extraordinarily plastic, able to solve unforeseen problems in ways that its opponents continue to predict that it cannot, thus proving itself superior to any proposed alternative? These are difficult questions that anyone who claims that an alternative is necessary must take seriously. (shrink)

The impacts of the activities of technological societies extends further into the future than their capacity to predict and control these impacts. Some have argued that the repercussions of this deficiency of knowledge cause fatal difficulties for both consequentialist and deontological accounts of future oriented obligations. Increasingly, international politics encompasses issues where this problem looms large: the connection between energy production and consumption and climate change provides an excellent example. As the reach of technologically-mediated social action increases, it is necessary (...) to ask whether a political imaginary that extends itself to match this reach requires new concepts, and how far they should displace traditional political concepts of obligation, based on reciprocity and harm avoidance. This paper draws on recent scholarship on the role of concepts of care in political philosophy, bringing together phenomenological and feminist concepts of care in contributing to a positive concept of non-reciprocal intergenerational obligation that defends a constitutive connection between care and justice. (shrink)