Was meint die moderne Wirtschaftswissenschaft, wenn sie von Zukunft redet und Künftiges vorhersagt? Wohin greift sie aus, wenn sie die Zukunft für den Menschen sichern oder offen halten will? Wie ist so etwas wie Zukunft in jener Epoche – dem Griechentum – erfahren und gedacht, in der zuerst die Möglichkeit einer Theoriebildung aufkam und also der Grund für ein Wissen von der Zukunft gelegt wurde? Der vorliegende Band versammelt die Beiträge zu zwei in den Jahren 2013 und 2014 an der (...) Freien Universität Bozen abgehaltenen Kolloquien zum Thema des Verhältnisses von Ökonomie und Zukunft. Die Absicht der Kolloquien wie auch dieser Publikation ist, auf das Fragwürdige jenes Verhältnisses hinzuweisen. In dieser Absicht verlieren die Begriffe „Ökonomie“ und „Zukunft“ ihre Eindeutigkeit und werden ihrerseits fragwürdig. (shrink)

'Reason, Causation and Compatibility with the Phenomena' strives to give answers to the philosophical problem of the interplay between realism, explanation and experience. This book is a compilation of essays that recollect significant conceptions of rival terms such as determinism and freedom, reason and appearance, power and knowledge. This title discusses the progress made in epistemology and natural philosophy, especially the steps that led from the ancient theory of atomism to the modern quantum theory, and from mathematization to analytic philosophy. (...) Moreover, it provides possible gateways from modern deadlocks of theory either through approaches to consciousness or through historical critique of intellectual authorities. This work will be of interest to those either researching or studying in colleges and universities, especially in the departments of philosophy, history of science, philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and quantum mechanics, history of ideas and culture. Greek and Latin Literature students and instructors may also find this book to be both a fascinating and valuable point of reference. (shrink)

Probability as understood today, namely as a quantitative notion expressible by means of a function ranging in the interval between 0–1, took shape in the mid-17th century, and presents both a mathematical and a philosophical aspect. Of these two sides, the second is by far the most controversial, and fuels a heated debate, still ongoing. After a short historical sketch of the birth and developments of probability, its major interpretations are outlined, by referring to the work of their most prominent (...) representatives. The final section addresses the question of whether any of such interpretations can presently be considered predominant, which is answered in the negative. (shrink)

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...) has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism. (shrink)

This anthology is about the signal change in Leibniz’s metaphysics with his explicit adoption of substantial forms in 1678-79. This change can either be seen as a moment of discontinuity with his metaphysics of maturity or as a moment of continuity, such as a passage to the metaphysics from his last years. Between the end of his sejour at Paris and the first part of the Hanover period, Leibniz reformed his dynamics and began to use the theory of corporeal substance. (...) This book explores a very important part of the philosophical work of the young Leibniz. Expertise from around the globe is collated here, including Daniel Garber’s work based on the recent publication of Leibniz's correspondence from the late 1690s, examining how the theory of monads developed during these crucial years. Richard Arthur argues that the introduction of substantial forms, reinterpreted as enduring primitive forces of action in each corporeal substance, allows Leibniz to found the reality of the phenomena of motion in force and thus avoid reducing motion to a mere appearance. Amongst other themes covered in this book, Pauline Phemister’s paper investigates Leibniz’s views on animals and plants, highlighting changes, modifications and elaborations over time of Leibniz’s views and supporting arguments and paying particular attention to his claim that the future is already contained in the seeds of living things. The editor, Adrian Nita, contributes a paper on the continuity or discontinuity of Leibniz’s work on the question of the unity and identity of substance from the perspective of the relation with soul and mind. (shrink)

In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is empirically (...) true: i.e. that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance with this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when Allais made his case against the neo-Bernoullians. (shrink)

This paper explores two persistent questions in the literature on presumptions: the place and the nature of presumptions in law and legal argumentation. These questions were originally raised by James Bradley Thayer, one of the masters of the Law of Evidence and the author of the classic chapter devoted this subject in A preliminary treatise on Evidence. Like Thayer, I believe that these questions deserve attention. First the paper shows that the connection between presumptions and argumentation is a constant feature (...) in the literature on presumptions, since its foundation in the Middle Ages to modern times. James Bradley Thayer was probably the last jurist who clearly saw that presumptions belong to argumentation. Second, the paper examines two sources of controversy in the language of presumptions. First, “presumption” is an ambiguous word in the legal discourse. As a result, it is almost impossible to provide a clear and succinct answer to the question “What is a presumption?”. Second, there are at least four reconstructions of the concept of presumption whose merits and shortcomings are relevant to explore. The analysis presented here may be of interest for legal and non-legal scholars and, hopefully, it may help to shed light on the possibilities and limits of an interdisciplinary dialogue about presumptions. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an account of the normative dimension implicit in D. Bernoulli’s expected utility functions by means of an analysis of the juridical metaphors upon which the concept of mathematical expectation was moulded. Following a suggestion by the late E. Coumet, I show how this concept incorporated a certain standard of justice which was put in question by the St. Petersburg paradox. I contend that Bernoulli would have solved it by introducing an alternative normative criterion rather than (...) a positive model of decision making processes. (shrink)

Choices rarely deal with certainties; and, where assertoric logic and modal logic are insufficient, those seeking to be reasonable turn to one or more things called “probability.” These things typically have a shared mathematical form, which is an arithmetic construct. The construct is often felt to be unsatisfactory for various reasons. A more general construct is that of a preordering, which may even be incomplete, allowing for cases in which there is no known probability relation between two propositions or between (...) two events. Previous discussion of incomplete preorderings has been as if incidental, with researchers focusing upon preorderings for which quantifications are possible. This article presents formal axioms for the more general case. Challenges peculiar to some specific interpretations of the nature of probability are brought to light in the context of these propositions. A qualitative interpretation is offered for probability differences that are often taken to be quantified. A generalization of Bayesian updating is defended without dependence upon coherence. Qualitative hypothesis testing is offered as a possible alternative in cases for which quantitative hypothesis testing is shown to be unsuitable. [NB: There is a transcription error in (A6), the quantification “∀(Y,c₂)” should be applied within the large parentheses to the proposition on the third row. You have my apologies!]. (shrink)

1. This paper addresses the development of mutual relations between two sets of ideas in scholastic logic. First, consider the following statements: (1) It is impossible to encounter a chimera.(2)...

In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin proposed a model for the layout of arguments: claim, data, warrant, qualifier, rebuttal, backing. Since then, Toulmin’s model has been appropriated, adapted and extended by researchers in speech communications, philosophy and artificial intelligence. This book assembles the best contemporary reflection in these fields, extending or challenging Toulmin’s ideas in ways that make fresh contributions to the theory of analysing and evaluating arguments.

Richard Rorty is easily cast as the intellectual godfather of our post-truth condition. But unlike Nicholas Gaskill, whose article in Common Knowledge 28, no. 3, has engendered a continuing symposium in the journal, Professor Fuller sees Rorty's role as being to his credit rather than detriment. Rorty extended W. B. Gallie's idea of “essentially contested concepts” from the moral and political spheres to the epistemic, thereby rendering such terms as truth, reason, and evidence inherently vague, which means that they are (...) defined not a priori but only in the context of exemplary concrete cases. Doing so invariably results in a “redescription” of what is observed that explains the “meta” level of understanding that philosophy brings to whatever it discusses. In this sense, all that the post-truth condition does is turn everyone into a philosopher. (shrink)

Choices rarely deal with certainties; and, where assertoric logic and modal logic are insufficient, those seeking to be reasonable turn to one or more things called “probability.” These things typically have a shared mathematical form, which is an arithmetic construct. The construct is often felt to be unsatisfactory for various reasons. A more general construct is that of a preordering, which may even be incomplete, allowing for cases in which there is no known probability relation between two propositions or between (...) two events. Previous discussion of incomplete preorderings has been as if incidental, with researchers focusing upon preorderings for which quantifications are possible. This article presents formal axioms for the more general case. Challenges peculiar to some specific interpretations of the nature of probability are brought to light in the context of these propositions. A qualitative interpretation is offered for probability differences that are often taken to be quantified. A generalization of Bayesian updating is defended without dependence upon coherence. Qualitative hypothesis testing is offered as a possible alternative in cases for which quantitative hypothesis testing is shown to be unsuitable. (shrink)