This paper has two goals. The first is to argue that the field of bioethics in general and the literature on ideal vs. nonideal theory in particular has underemphasized a primary problem for normative theorizing: the role of conditioning principles. I define these as principles that implicitly or explicitly ground, limit, or otherwise determine the construction and function of other principles, and, as a result, profoundly impact concept formation, perception, judgment, and action, et al. The second is to demonstrate that (...) ableism is one such conditioning principle and that it undermines the field of bioethics and the practice of biomedicine from achieving the aim of justice as fairness. After briefly addressing the history and critiques of principlism in bioethics, I lay out and defend my account of conditioning principles. I then argue that ableism is one such principle and demonstrate it at work through an analysis of a storied debate between Eva Kittay, Peter Singer, and Jeff McMahan. In conclusion, I contend that the ethical and philosophical dangers of conditioning principles are too easily exacerbated by ideal theory frameworks, and I do so by demonstrating how they are especially liable to generate epistemic injustice, especially contributory and hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

The guiding premise from which this special report begins is the conviction and hope that justice is at the normative heart of medicine and that it is the perpetual task of bioethics to bring concerns of justice to bear on medical practice. On such an account, justice is medicine's lifeblood, that by which it contributes to life as opposed to diminishing it. It is in this larger, historical, intersectional, critical, and ethically minded context that we must approach pressing questions facing (...) medicine, including the question of the import and role of genomic knowledge for human life. The second premise is that, at least in principle, the knowledge generated by genomics can be a gift or a weight, or both at the same time. That is to say that, on the one hand, genomic knowledge is a gift, creating novel insights into the genetic drivers of disease and into the geographical paths of our ancestors. And on the other hand, it is a weight, creating new obligations, new forms of social classification, and new forms of surveillance. Because it is in many ways the “common sense” of the day that genomic knowledge is a gift, this special report, which contains nine essays, concentrates on the ways in which such knowledge can be a weight, a weight that has the potential to thwart—and historically has thwarted—medicine from genuinely advancing justice . (shrink)

Since the 1960s, it has been recognized that “medical ethics,” the area of inquiry about the obligations of practitioners of medicine, is inadequate for capturing and addressing the complexities associated with modern medicine, human health, and wellbeing. Subsequently, a new specialty emerged which involved scholars and professionals from a variety of disciplines who had an interest in healthcare ethics. The name adopted is variously biomedical ethics or bioethics. The practice of bioethics in clinical settings is clinical ethics and its primary (...) aim is to resolve patient care issues and conflicts. Nurses are among these clinical ethicists. They are drawn to the study and practice of bioethics and its applications as way to address the problems encountered in practice. A significant number are among the ranks of clinical ethicists. However, in the role of bio- or clinical ethicist, some retained the title of their original profession, calling themselves nurse ethicists, and some did not. In this article, we explore under which conditions it is permissible or preferable that one retains one’s prior profession’s nomenclature as a prefix to “ethicist,” under which conditions it is not, and why. We emphasize the need for transparency of purpose related to titles and their possible influence on individual and social good. (shrink)