I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. -/- There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably (...) infinite, then the property of being a tautology is \Pi^1_1-complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is \Sigma_1-definable in set theory. -/- Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, je pars de l’analyse intuitionniste de la vérité mathématique, « A est vrai si et seulement s’il existe une preuve de A » comme cas particulier de l’analyse de la vérité en termes de « vérifacteur », et je montre pourquoi Wittgenstein partageait celle-ci avec les intuitionnistes. Cependant, la notion de preuve à l’oeuvre dans cette analyse est, selon l’intuitionnisme, celle de la « preuve-comme-objet », et je montre par la suite, en interprétant son argument sur le (...) caractère « synoptique » des preuves, que Wittgenstein avait plutôt en tête une conception de la « preuve-comme-trace ».In this paper, I start with the intutionist analysis of mathematical truth, « A is true if and only if there exists a proof of A », as a particular case of the analysis of truth in terms of « truth-makers », and I show why Wittgenstein shared it with the intuitionists. However, the notion of proof at work in this analysis is, according to intuitionism, that of « proof-as-object », and I then show, with an interpretation of his argument on the « surveyability » of proofs, that, instead, Wittgenstein had in mind a notion of « proof-as-trace ». (shrink)

In this paper, I present a summary of the philosophical relationship betweenWittgenstein and Brouwer, taking as my point of departure Brouwer's lecture onMarch 10, 1928 in Vienna. I argue that Wittgenstein having at that stage not doneserious philosophical work for years, if one is to understand the impact of thatlecture on him, it is better to compare its content with the remarks on logics andmathematics in the Tractactus. I thus show that Wittgenstein's position, in theTractactus, was already quite close to (...) Brouwer's and that the points of divergence are the basis to Wittgenstein's later criticisms of intuitionism. Among the topics of comparison are the role of intuition in mathematics, rule following, choice sequences, the Law of Excluded Middle, and the primacy of arithmetic over logic. (shrink)

Formal series are associated with ascriptions of numbers. They are ordered by formal operations that, unlike negation and disjunction, are not truth-operations. In spite of this, they are required to build propositions involving generic reference to numbers, and are essential to the Tractarian version of the logicist project.

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 2, Page 107-129, April 2022.

In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintained that arithmetic consists of equations arrived at by the practice of calculating outcomes of operations$\Omega ^{n}(\bar {\xi })$defined with the help of numeral exponents. Since$Num$(x) and quantification over numbers seem ill-formed, Ramsey wrote that the approach is faced with “insuperable difficulties.” This paper takes Wittgenstein to have assumed that his audience would have an understanding of the implicit general rules governing his operations. By employing the Tractarian logicist interpretation that theN-operator$N(\bar {\xi })$and recursively defined arithmetic (...) operators$\Omega ^{n}(\bar {\xi })$are not different in kind, we can address Ramsey’s problem. Moreover, we can take important steps toward better understanding how Wittgenstein might have imagined emulating proof by mathematical induction. (shrink)

We expose some basic elements of a style of programming supported by functional languages like Haskell by relating them to a coherent set of notions and techniques from Curry’s work in combinatory logic and formal systems, and their algebraic and categorical interpretations. Our account takes the form of a commentary to a simple fragment of Haskell code attempting to isolate the conceptual sources of the linguistic abstractions involved.

En este trabajo trato de dar respuesta a la cuestión acerca de si los conceptos formales del Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein son o no categorías ontológicas. Mi respuesta es que no. Así, después de ofrecer una definición de ‘ontología’ y diferentes lecturas sobre las proposiciones iniciales del Tractatus, presento la noción de concepto formal o lógico, así como diferentes interpretaciones en relación con el papel de esos conceptos en el Tractatus. Después, y teniendo en consideración lo dicho en las secciones (...) precedentes, presento mi propia lectura de las proposiciones iniciales en términos de expresiones conceptuales o gramaticales, la distinción tanto en extensión como en intensión de las nociones de concepto formal o lógico y categoría ontológica y la disolución de la ontología, que no de la lógica. Finalmente ofrezco unas conclusiones finales que recogen aspectos centrales de la discusión precedente. (shrink)