In this thesis I outline a view of primary legislation from a systems perspective. I suggest that systems theory and, in particular, autopoietic theory, as modified by field theory, is a mechanism for understanding how society operates. The description of primary legislation that I outline differs markedly from any conventional definition in that I argue that primary legislation is not, and indeed cannot be, either a law or any of the euphemisms that are usually accorded to an enactment by a (...) parliament. I cite two reasons for such a conclusion. The primary reason for my conclusion is that I see primary legislation as being an output of a particular subsystem of society, while the law is the output of another subsystem of society. I argue that these outputs are the discrete products of separate subsystems of society. I argue that primary legislation should be viewed as a trinity. The first state of this trinity is that, upon enactment, primary legislation is a brute fact in that it is but a thing and the only property of this thing is that of being a text. The second state of this trinity is that following the act of enactment, the thing enacted will be reproduced and this reproduction is a separate thing that will sit in some repository until used. The third state of this trinity is that, upon use, this thing that is primary legislation will be transformed into an object and the user will attribute such functions and attributes to that object as are appropriate to the context within which the object is used. The thing has therefore become an object and an institutional fact. The second reason for my conclusion that primary legislation is not a law relates to the fact that the thing that is primary legislation is a text and the only function of a text is that it is available to be read. That is to say, of itself, a text is incapable of doing anything: it is the reader who defines the status of the text and attributes functions and attributes. Upon use, primary legislation thus becomes a censored input for future action and one of these actions may be some statement by a court of law. I assert that the view of primary legislation that has been accepted within the body politic is the product of the discourse of a particular subsystem of society that I have designated 'the legal practice', and I outline why and how this has occurred. Outlining a view about primary legislation also necessitates outlining a view as to the nature of the law. I assert that the law is a myth and I see this myth as a product of the discourse of the legal practice. I have asserted that although it is the judges that state the law, such statements flow from the discourse of those who practise the law. (shrink)

The paper makes a twofold contribution. Firstly, it advances a preliminary account of the conditions that need to obtain for constitutional rights to be democratic. Secondly, in so doing, it defends precommitment-based theories from a criticism raised by Jeremy Waldron—namely, that constitutional rights do not become any more democratic when they are democratically adopted, for the people could adopt undemocratic policies without such policies becoming democratic as a result. The paper shows that the reductio applies to political rights, yet not (...) to non-political rights, such as reproductive, environmental, or privacy rights. The democratic status of the former is process-independent. The latter, by contrast, are democratic precisely when they are adopted by democratic means. (shrink)

That government agencies and public bodies can be liable for damages when they induce and then frustrate people’s legitimate expectations is an important and distinctive feature of administrative law in Europe. This article sets out to establish a set of moral principles and ideals that might justify this legal institution. The notion of security of expectations found in the work of utilitarian writers provides a starting point. Having examined the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, I then turn to consider (...) an alternative argument based on finding a solution to the problem of credible commitments. Finally, I look for suitable moral arguments in the liberal and Kantian political theorising of John Rawls. I argue that if we see the function of the rule of law as not merely to maximise aggregate utility and to make policymakers’ decisions seem credible but also to ensure Justice as Fairness for individuals, then this provides a more robust and satisfactory way to justify the liability of public bodies for legitimate expectations they induce and then frustrate. (shrink)

Recent work in democratic theory has seriously questioned the dominant pluralist model of self-government and recommended the adoption of a ‘deliberative’ conception of constitutional democracy. With this shift in basic political theory, the objection to judicial review, often voiced in jurisprudential theory, as an anti-democratic instance of paternalism merits another look. This paper argues that the significant differences between four recent theories of constitutional review—put forward by Ely, Perry, Dworkin, and Habermas—are best understood as arising from different positions taken on (...) two cross-cutting distinctions that have been inherited from Locke and Rousseau: democratic processes as aggregative versus deliberative, and democratic legitimacy as substantive versus procedural. A reconstruction and critical evaluation of the four theories of judicial review, with special emphasis on their underlying theories of constitutional democracy, yields a set of criteria for adequate accounts of democratic processes, democratic legitimacy, and their relation to judicial review. I argue that the best understanding of constitutional review is yielded by Habermas’s theory because it combines a conception of popular sovereignty in terms of the collective process of citizens’ deliberative attempt to institutionalize the general will through law, with a resolutely proceduralist conception of democratic legitimacy. However, I also argue that some of the specific proposals Habermas makes concerning the institutionalization of constitutional review in an independent, non-accountable judiciary and the scope of duties for such a body need to be modified in the light of his overriding commitments to participatory deliberative processes and procedural legitimacy. (shrink)

Courts are sometimes called upon to review a law or some other official act of government to determine its constitutionality, its reasonableness, rationality, or its compatibility with fundamental principles of justice. In some jurisdictions, this power of judicial review includes the ability to ‘strike down’ or nullify a law duly passed by a legislature body. This article examines this practice and various criticisms of it, including the charge that it is fundamentally undemocratic. The focus is on the powerful critique mounted (...) by Jeremy Waldron, the foremost philosophical opponent of judicial review. (shrink)

Over the last 30 years, scholarship has produced countless books, essays, and articles on populism by investigating it from various perspectives and angles. This article seeks to contribute to this ongoing debate by offering a political-philosophical reconstruction of populism to define such a phenomenon from a multilateral perspective. The essay will proceed as follows: The first section will investigate populism from a purely political-philosophical position, while the second will discuss the constitutional effects of such a phenomenon, to define it mainly (...) as a form of anti-liberal and anti-judicial redefinition of democracy. Moreover, the first section will expose the dichotomy between the so-called left- and right-forms of the populist model and the populist threat to democracy, where the second will address populist constitutionalism and its antithetic relation to liberal constitutionalism.Footnote11 This article is the result of a period of research spent at the CAS-SEE UNIRI – Center for Advanced Studies of the University of Rijeka, Croatia. I wish to thank the Institute and its members for the opportunity to develop this research. Part of this research has been presented at the doctoral seminar of the Doctoral School of History and Philosophical-Social Sciences, University of Rome Tor Vergata. I wish to thank my colleagues Alessandro Ferrara, Matteo Bianchin, Tonino Griffero, Claudia Gina Hassan as well as the doctoral students of our programme, for comments and suggestions. (shrink)

The recent decades have seen established liberal democracies expand their surveillance capacities on a massive scale. This article explores what is problematic about government surveillance by democracies. It proceeds by distinguishing three potential sources of concern: the concern that governments diminish citizens’ privacy by collecting their data, the concern that they diminish their privacy by accessing their data, and the concern that the collected data may be used for objectionable purposes. Discussing the meaning and value of privacy, the article argues (...) that only the latter two constitute compelling independent concerns. It then focuses particularly on the third concern, exploring the risk of government surveillance being used to enforce illegitimate laws. It discusses three legitimacy-related reasons why we should be worried about the expansion of surveillance capacities in established democracies: Even established democracies might decay. There is a risk that surveillance capacities that are used for democratically legitimated purposes today will be used for poorly legitimated purposes in the future. Surveillance may be used to enforce laws that lack legitimacy due to the disproportionate punishment attached to their violation. The democratic procedures in established democracies fail to conform to the requirements formulated by mainstream theories of democratic legitimacy. Surveillance is thus used to enforce laws whose legitimacy is in doubt. (shrink)

Focusing on the case of Colombia, this article sets out a sociological examination of constitutions marked by strong, activist judiciaries, by entrenched systems of human rights protection, and by emphatic implementation of global human rights law. Contra standard critiques of this constitutional model, it argues that such constitutions need to be seen as creating a new pattern of democracy, which is often distinctively adapted to structures in societies in which the typical patterns of legitimation and subject formation required for democratic (...) government were obstructed. In polities with such constitutions, legal institutions and norm setters have at times assumed the status offunctional equivalentsfor more typical democratically mandated actors and institutions. In such polities, further, global law assumes essential importance as it creates new sources of normative authorization for legislation and stimulates new lines of articulation between government and society. The article concludes that analysis of such polities, exemplified by Colombia, shows that the common categories of democratic-constitutional analysis are no longer always adequate for understanding current tendencies in democratic formation, and they can easily undermine democracy itself. (shrink)

This article considers the relationship between moral philosophy and constitutional theory through a detailed examination of the work of Jeremy Waldron—an unavoidable voice in contemporary constitutionalist debate. Through a rigorous, original and holistic deconstruction of his work and its philosophical implications, I argue that Waldron’s engagement with core philosophy within his constitutional scholarship is wholly problematic, containing a number of ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies. These issues, I suggest, may stem from an at times rather casual treatment of the realist/anti-realist issue (...) of core philosophy, perhaps owing something to his view that it is in fact safely irrelevant to his constitutional pursuits. In any case, this view, I argue, is misguided, and the problems which result are real: they not only create issues of theoretical consistency and clarity; they put Waldron’s constitutional theory in danger. Like all good tales, I suggest there are lessons to be learned from this: one must think, and think carefully, about the philosophical background of one’s work, and take care in setting this out in a clear, thorough and coherent way—the stakes are too high not to. With this in mind, this article also lays some groundwork for a path into constitutional theory firmly grounded in my own anti-realist moral scepticism. (shrink)

Theorists of public reason such as John Rawls often idealize constitutional courts as exemplars of public reason. This paper raises questions about the seduction and limits of analogies between theorists’ account of public reason and actual constitutional jurisprudence. Examining the work product of the United States Supreme Court, the paper argues that while it does engage in reason-giving to support its decisions—as the public reason strategy suggests— those reasons are (largely) legalistic and specifically juristic reasons—not the theorists’ idealized moral-political reasons (...) on matters of fundamental principle. But if constitutional courts do not engage on matters of fundamental principle, then a public reason strategy for assuaging democratic worries about judicial review would no longer be open: prominent liberal and deliberative democratic theorists could no longer point to the alleged superiority of constitutional courts to speak in the name of, and for, the people’s shared political principles. The paper extends beyond the U.S. case study by pointing to three institutional factors explaining the disanalogy between what some constitutional courts do and what public reason theories require them to do. It concludes with considerations about whether the public reason strategy might be more successfully applied to international courts. (shrink)

I argue that there are liberal reasons to reject what I call “Global Individualism”, which is the conjunction of two views strongly associated with liberalism: moral individualism and social individualism. According to the first view, all moral properties are reducible to individual moral properties. The second holds that the social world is composed only of individual agents. My argument has the following structure: after suggesting that Global Individualism does not misrepresent liberalism, I draw on some recent insights in social ontology (...) to show that it is inconsistent with the satisfaction of an important liberal principle related to the protection of individual rights over time. As I hold, to solve this problem we need to accept group agents acting as moral agents, which in turn commits us to the weaker notion of normative individualism (a view that is consistent with the existence of some group moral properties). I conclude with the suggestion that even this solution is costly for liberalism, for the conjunction of group moral agency and normative individualism makes the latter unstable and compels liberals to a much less individualistic stance than expected. (shrink)

The author revisits H. L. A. Hart's theory of positive law and argues for a major qualification to the thesis of the separation of law and morality based on a concept of systemic legitimacy derived from the social theory of Jurgen Habermas. He argues that standards for assessing the degree of systemic legitimacy in modern legal systems can develop through reflective exercise of “critical legality,” a concept coined to parallel Hart's “critical morality,” and an expanded understanding of the “external” and (...) “internal” perspectives on legal systems. Following Habermas, he argues that modern positive law must retain systemic legitimacy. After suggesting criteria for measuring systemic legitimacy, the author concludes that the concept provides a useful approach to contemporary problems of “lawless” regimes and “law's imperialism.”. (shrink)

The first section takes up some main details of American constitutional history. At the end of that section and in section two, we concentrate on one constitutional doctrine in particular, judicial review. We argue that this doctrine rests, traditionally, on the foundational idea of a permanent tension between democratic institutions and basic rights. In section three, we deal with the problem just raised, by suggesting an alternative view of the relationship that exists between these fundamental constitutional elements. Here we attempt (...) to show that there is an essential principled harmony between basic constitutional rights and democratic majority rule. And we try to locate judicial review within this alternative conception. Then in section four and in the conclusion we discuss the institutional arrangements for the practice of judicial review in the light of this alternative conception. (shrink)

This paper addresses two questions. First, how different is the ideal underlying deliberative democracy from the ideal expressed in contemporary liberal theory, especially contractualist theory and "political liberalism"? Second, what specific institutional prescriptions, if any, follow from deliberative democracy? It is argued that the deliberative ideal has become quite abstract and, in fact, does not differ significantly from many forms of contemporary liberalism. Moreover, it is something of an open question just what institutions best realize this ideal. Specifically, the ideal (...) does not necessarily require conventional, majoritarian institutions. (shrink)

The constitutionalist debate - over where decision-making power in society should lie, and how it should be exercised - is one which is of fundamental importance not only in academia and constitutional theory, but in society generally. The main aim of this thesis is to critically examine the current debate from a particular, sceptical philosophical perspective - one which questions the possibility of convincingly defending moral premises. This controversial perspective, which goes to the heart of debates over moral realism, objectivity, (...) and epistemology is set out and defended in detail, drawing on the work of the sceptical and strongly anti-foundationalist legal theorist, Arthur Leff, and the pragmatic philosophy of Richard Rorty. Some implications of this perspective for the constitutionalist debate and key approaches within it are then considered in the rest of the thesis . This examination includes instrumentalist arguments and "democratic" arguments often relied on by various sides in the debate. It is argued that, when taken to their underlying premises and assumptions, each approach is misguided from the perspective defended here and, therefore, that the current constitutionalist debate is unsatisfactory. Some suggestions of the way forward following this argument are then made. (shrink)