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Kinds and persons

Peter A. French

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (2):241-254 (1983)

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Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie.Daniel Cohnitz - 2006 - Mentis.details Wie ist es wohl, eine Fledermaus zu sein? Wäre ein rein physikalisches Duplikat von mir nur ein empfindungsloser Zombie? Muss man sich seinem Schicksal ergeben, wenn man sich unfreiwillig als lebensnotwendige Blutwaschanlage eines weltberühmten Violinisten wieder findet? Kann man sich wünschen, der König von China zu sein? Bin ich vielleicht nur ein Gehirn in einem Tank mit Nährflüssigkeit, das die Welt von einer Computersimulation vorgegaukelt bekommt? Worauf beziehen sich die Menschen auf der Zwillingserde mit ihrem Wort 'Wasser', wenn es bei (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 19 citations
Does the state have moral duties? State duty-claims and the possibility of institutionally held moral obligations.Christoffer Spencer Lammer-Heindel - unknowndetails We commonly attribute to states and other institutional organizations moral duties and obligations. For example, it is widely held that the state has a moral duty to protect its citizens from external threats and it is claimed that it ought to positively promote the welfare of its members. When we focus on the surface grammar of such institutional duty-claims, we see that they seem to differ from individual duty-claims only with respect to the subject of the claim. Whereas an institutional (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Supposed Moral Agency of Corporations.Matthew Lampert - 2016 - Ephemera 16 (1):79-105.details Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been traditionally framed within business ethics as a discourse attempting to identify certain moral responsibilities of corporations (as well as get these corporations to fulfill their responsibilities). This theory has often been normatively grounded in the idea that a corporation is (or ought to be treated as) a moral agent. I argue that it is a mistake to think of (or treat) corporations as moral agents, and that CSR’s impotency is a direct result of this (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Problems about corporate moral personhood.ThomasW Smythe - 1985 - Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (4):327-333.details According to peter french, A corporation can be construed as a moral person in the same sense that you and I are persons. Whether this view is tenable is an open question. I examine the objections to this view made in the recent literature and find them wanting. I deal with the questions whether corporations can have intentions, Rights, And consciousness. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Should we tolerate people who split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.details Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be. Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
How Should We Interpret Institutional Duty-Claims?Christoffer Lammer-Heindel - 2013 - Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies 18 (1):27-34.details It is rather natural to suppose that what we mean when we say that an institutional organization has a moral duty is parallel to whatever it is that we mean when we say that an individual has a duty. I challenge this interpretation on the grounds that it assumes that institutional organizations possess those characteristics or abilities requisite for moral agency—an assumption which I argue is highly suspicious. Against such an interpretation, I argue that we have very good reasons to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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