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  1. The epistemic import of phenomenal consciousness.Paweł Jakub Zięba - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-37.
    This paper controverts the ability of intentionalism about perception to account for unique epistemic significance of phenomenal consciousness. More specifically, the intentionalist cannot explain the latter without denying two well-founded claims: the transparency of experience, and the possibility of unconscious perception. If they are true, intentionality of perception entails that phenomenal consciousness has no special epistemic role to play. Although some intentionalists are ready to bite this bullet, by doing so they effectively undermine one of the standard motivations of their (...)
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  • Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given.Alfonso Anaya - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7453-7476.
    This paper articulates and argues for the plausibility of the Presentation View of Perceptual Knowledge, an under-discussed epistemology of perception. On this view, a central epistemological role of perception is that of making subjects aware of their surroundings. By doing so, perception affords subjects with reasons for world-directed judgments. Moreover, the very perceived concrete entities are identified as those reasons. The former claim means that the position is a reasons-based epistemology; the latter means that it endorses a radically anti-psychologist conception (...)
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  • Naïve realism and supersaturated hue.William A. Sharp - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.
    Naïve realists have yet to successfully discharge the problem of supersaturated hue, afterimage-experiences as of hued surfaces that are beyond-maximally saturated. The experiences are a problem for the view because supersaturation, qua property of external objects, is an impossible color property. Accordingly, the experiences cannot be handled in terms of their indiscriminability from perceptions of such surfaces, in the manner of Martin ( 2004 ). Nor can they be handled in terms of seen surfaces looking supersaturated, in the manner of (...)
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  • In touch with the facts: epistemological disjunctivism and the rationalisation of belief.Edgar Phillips - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):402-427.
    The idea of believing for a good reason has both normative and psychological content. How are these related? Recently, a number of authors have defended a ‘disjunctivist’ view of rationalisation, on which a good reason can make a subject’s responses to it intelligible in a way that mere ‘apparent reasons’ cannot. However, little has been said about the possible epistemological significance of this view or its relationship to more familiar forms of disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception. This paper examines (...)
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