Este trabajo se propone mostrar cómo la Teoría Neoclásica de la Ley Natural fundamenta la existencia de normas morales absolutas, cuál es su relevancia para la filosofía moral, y qué críticas pueden ser formuladas a la argumentación de los autores. Ellos postulan que la ley natural, mediante normas, lleva a elegir y proteger bienes humanos básicos, correspondientes a los diversos aspectos de la naturaleza humana, evitando su destrucción, daño o impedimento. Aunque la mayoría de las normas morales admiten excepción, nunca (...) lo hacen las que prohíben realizar un acto que siempre daña directamente un bien básico, pues tal acto no puede compatibilizarse con la propia autorrealización, y atenta contra la dignidad humana. La división del trabajo tomará la siguiente forma: en los primeros cuatro apartados se abordarán los conceptos clave para la defensa de una norma absoluta en la Teoría Neoclásica, en el quinto se enlazarán los conceptos al modo que los autores lo hacen para demostrar la existencia de absolutos morales y someter el consecuencialismo a crítica, y en el sexto se hará una breve revisión crítica de los argumentos presentados. (shrink)

In a previous paper in this journal, Jennifer Frey presented three arguments against New-Kantian approaches. This paper briefly reiterates these arguments and shows why New-Kantian positions do not succumb to them. Most noteworthy, such positions are formal and not substantive. They care little about the question whether people pursue the same goods and instead stress the role of procedure in explicating rationality and consent in explicating the good. By stressing this distinction between formal and substantive approaches, this paper also provides (...) a hint to the contentious topic of how Kantians can deal with cultural diversity, historicity, and plurality in ethics. It finishes with some questions to the author of the previous paper: do non-formal approaches imply that peace can only exist within similarity? (shrink)

This essay explores the legacy of the four philosophers now often referred to as ‘The Wartime Quartet’: G.E.M. Anscombe, Iris Murdoch, Philippa Foot and Mary Midgley. The life and work of the four, who studied together in Oxford during the Second World War, is the subject of two recently published books, The Women Are Up to Something, by Benjamin Lipscomb, and Metaphysical Animals, by Clare Mac Cumhaill and Rachael Wiseman. The two books show us how Anscombe, Murdoch, Foot and Midgley (...) became friends united in their hostility to the logical-positivist orthodoxy of the day and its deleterious influence on Oxford moral philosophy. And we see how their friendship had a formative influence on their subsequent—highly distinguished—careers, so that it is possible to discern, if not exactly a school of thought, then various common themes, ideas and concerns, which are expressed and developed in contrasting ways. While Lipscomb represents the work of the Quartet as of largely historical significance, my paper defends what I take to be Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman's position that their legacy is very much a living one, containing insights that are not just of enduring relevance, but can transform how we see ourselves and how we do philosophy. For Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman, the key idea shared by the members of the Quartet is to place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention. This commitment has at least four dimensions: (i) an interest in the ordinary; (ii) a focus on virtue, goodness and human flourishing; (iii) an affirmation of our animal nature; (iv) recognition of the normative landscape that structures our lives. I try to bring out the philosophical significance of these themes in a way relevant to the philosophical elucidation of education. (shrink)