The principle of trust has been placed at the centre as an attitude for engaging with clinical machine learning systems. However, the notions of trust and distrust remain fiercely debated in the philosophical and ethical literature. In this article, we proceed on a structural level ex negativo as we aim to analyse the concept of “institutional distrustworthiness” to achieve a proper diagnosis of how we should not engage with medical machine learning. First, we begin with several examples that hint at (...) the emergence of a climate of distrust in the context of medical machine learning. Second, we introduce the concept of institutional trustworthiness based on an expansion of Hawley’s commitment account. Third, we argue that institutional opacity can undermine the trustworthiness of medical institutions and can lead to new forms of testimonial injustices. Finally, we focus on possible building blocks for repairing institutional distrustworthiness. (shrink)

At the heart of Jennifer Lackey's recent book is highly original work in identifying a form of testimonial injustice that is quite distinct from those hitherto identified. Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice there has been an enormous flurry of work done on injustices where people are wronged as givers of knowledge (testimonial injustice) or where people are wronged in their capacity as a subject of social understanding (hermeneutical injustice). Fricker’s focus in that book was on cases where (...) people are not believed or where deflated credibility is given to their word as a result of prejudice in the hearer . However, Lackey points out that there are many instances where people are wronged not by being granted too little credibility but by being given too much credibility. False confessions, guilty pleas, and eyewitness testimony are sometimes taken as sufficient to imprison people or even execute them, despite the fact that the testimony in question has been extracted through manipulation, deception, and coercion and despite the fact that other evidence is lacking or conflicts with the false confessions, guilty pleas, or eyewitness testimony. (shrink)

At the heart of Jennifer Lackey's recent book is highly original work in identifying a form of testimonial injustice that is quite distinct from those hitherto identified. Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice there has been an enormous flurry of work done on injustices where people are wronged as givers of knowledge (testimonial injustice) or where people are wronged in their capacity as a subject of social understanding (hermeneutical injustice). Fricker’s focus in that book was on cases where (...) people are not believed or where deflated credibility is given to their word as a result of prejudice in the hearer. However, Lackey points out that there are many instances where people are wronged not by being granted too little credibility but by being given too much credibility. False confessions, guilty pleas, and eyewitness testimony are sometimes taken as sufficient to imprison people or even execute them, despite the fact that the testimony in question has been extracted through manipulation, deception, and coercion and despite the fact that other evidence is lacking or conflicts with the false confessions, guilty pleas, or eyewitness testimony. (shrink)