The received view has it that Hans Reichenbach and his friends of the Berlin Group worked close together with the more prominent Vienna Circle. In the wake of this view, Reichenbach was often treated as a logical positivist – despite the fact that he decisively opposed it. In this chapter we follow another thread. We shall show the “third man”– besides Reichenbach and Walter Dubislav – of the Berlin Group, Kurt Grelling, as a man who could grasp the academic trends (...) of the time faster than anybody else, who was better informed about logic and philosophy of nature than his two prominent colleagues and thus, could better delineate, although tentatively, central threads of research of the Berlin Group. Grelling did this on several occasions, but most ostensibly in the last years of his life when he was focused on problems of formal ontology. On the basis of this analysis, we shall see that in the early 1920s, Reichenbach too was led by a project in ontology of science that he elaborated together with the psychologist Kurt Lewin. Moreover, Reichenbach’s later philosophy of nature was also shaped by this project. We present this direction of philosophy of science as a “road less travelled” which, however, if revived, can point to a new direction that will more closely connect philosophy and science. (shrink)

Michael Friedman has recently developed a neo-Kantian conception of science as a rival to holistic accounts. According to Friedman, the main virtue of his neo-Kantian philosophy is that it resolves the problem of incommensurability. A close reading of Friedman's work, however, indicates that his account surprisingly accomplishes the opposite of what he believes to have defended. This article will argue that the real virtue of Friedman's neo-Kantian account of scientific theories is not that it resolves the problem of incommensurability but (...) that it provides an elegant philosophical account much needed to substantiate Thomas Kuhn's historical thesis of incommensurability. -/- . (shrink)

L’enjeu de cet article est d’exposer les principaux aspects du débat philosophique contemporain autour de la conception de l’ a priori de Michael Friedman. Ce dernier a défendu l’existence de principes constitutifs a priori permettant de coordonner la structure mathématique des théories physiques avec l’expérience sensorielle. Bien qu’il s’appuie sur la conception cassirérienne de l’ a priori pour défendre une continuité entre les structures mathématiques des théories, Friedman, dans la lignée d’Hans Reichenbach, conçoit ces principes constitutifs comme révisables en fonction (...) des changements de théories physiques. Cette conception des principes constitutifs s’est vu reprocher un certain arbitraire dans le choix de ses principes, mais également son insuffisance et son simplisme pour décrire la manière avec laquelle les théories physiques s’appliquent à l’expérience. Enfin, il ne semble pas que l’on puisse, comme Friedman, réduire l’ a priori d’Ernst Cassirer à son rôle régulateur, puisque celui-ci concevrait également des principes constitutifs alternatifs à ceux de Reichenbach. (shrink)

This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassen's solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedman's approach, which appeals to philosophical developments at (...) a meta-theoretical level, does not really address the problem of rationality as posed by Kuhn's work. Instead of showing how, despite revolutions, scientific development is, indeed, rational, he gives a transcendental account of rational scientific progress. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest częściowe uzasadnienie negacji tezy, którą nazywam tezą o genezie realizmu strukturalnego. Dotyczy ona postulowanych w obrębie pewnej metafilozoficznej narracji związków między współczesnymi stanowiskami zwanymi epistemicznym realizmem strukturalnym i ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym a poglądami filozofów z początku XX wieku. W artykule rekonstruuję wymienione dwa stanowiska, postulowane związki, jakie mają one mieć z dwoma filozofami, Henri Poincarém oraz Ernstem Cassirerem, a następnie przedstawiam, dlaczego te postulowane związki są nietrafnie rozpoznane. Niesie to za sobą wnioski dotyczące swoistości wymienionych stanowisk oraz (...) pojęć obiektywności i rzeczywistości w ich kontekście. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how Cassirer’s early and mature epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of culture make up a coherent and comprehensive view of the mathematical sciences that is fruitful for understanding contemporary science. In Cassirer’s first systematic work, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, the mathematical sciences are understood through the concept of function. This implies that scientific investigation aims at increased unity in a system of functional concepts, rather than at answering the substance-rooted question of what is. In his (...) mature work, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Cassirer expands his inquiry to diverse notions of objects and principles of symbolic forming, recognizing the mathematical sciences as one of many ways of structuring experience, alongside other symbolic forms such as myth and ordinary language. Together, Cassirer’s early and mature works detail the preconditions and idiosyncrasies of the unfolding of scientific objects and situate the mathematical sciences within the totality of human experience. Applying these insights to contemporary interpretations of science suggests connecting common misconceptions of science to challenges in translating objects between symbolic forms. I propose the concepts of domestication and mythification of science as instructive for clearing up such misunderstandings. (shrink)