The topic of epistemic injustice in global health ethics is complex, important and vast. While presenting as nuanced and complete a picture of the challenge as we possibly could, we were acutely aware of our positionality and how it gave us a certain viewpoint that would need to be expanded by others with different positions and experiences. We were, therefore, delighted to receive the collected commentaries by Atuire,1 Abimbola,2 Frimpong-Mansoh,3 Nyamnjoh and Ewuoso,4 Tangwa,5 Ambrogi et al.6 We would like to (...) thank these authors for furthering our account by raising questions, pointing out gaps or complementing our analysis. The points raised by these authors—and many points that will undoubtedly be raised by others in future—should be critically engaged with as we collectively define and work towards a more epistemically just global health ethics. Specifically, two points stand out. First, Frimpong-Mansoh accurately diagnoses our ambiguity about being drawn into debates about relativism in bioethics. We …. (shrink)