The monumental works of Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat have set a firm pattern of interpretation which many follow in their approach to the Philosophy of Leibniz. In the Preface to the second edition of The Philosophy of Leibniz , Russell reaffirms his contention that “Leibniz’s philosophy was almost entirely derived from his logic”. He welcomes the support provided in Couturat’s La Logique de Leibniz . Russell remarks “No candid reader—can doubt that Leibniz’s metaphysic was derived by him from the (...) subject-predicate logic. This appears, for example, from the paper ‘Primae Veritates’ where all the main doctrines of the Monadology are deduced, with terse logical rigor from the premises; ‘Always therefore the predicate or consequent adheres in the subject or antecedent, and in this fact consists the nature of truth in general—But this is true in every affirmative truth, universal or singular, necessary or contingent’.” Referring further to Couturat, he points out that in his book the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” and “The Identity of Indiscernibles” are “expressly deduced—from the analytic character of all true propositions”. In short, Russell is contending that in formulating his metaphysics Leibniz used the rigorous methods of deductive logic and employed “models” drawn from logic to construct his “picture of reality”, i.e. his metaphysics. (shrink)

This article discusses Leibniz’s claim that every substance is endowed with the property of perception in connection with Platonism, rationalism and the problem of substance monism. It is argued that Leibniz’s ascription of perception to every substance relies on his Platonic conception of finite things as imitations of God, in whom there is ‘infinite perception’. Leibniz’s Platonism, however, goes beyond the notion of imitation, including also the emanative causal relation and the logical (i.e. definitional) priority of the absolute over the (...) limited. It is proposed that Leibniz’s endorsement of Platonism, in conjunction with some rationalist elements of his philosophy, implies a monistic conception of particulars as modifications of a single substance. Following some scholars and opposing others, the article offers evidence that Leibniz accepted this implication during the last years of his Paris period. However, it is further argued that it was precisely the idea of perception as a property of every substance that allowed Leibniz to find a way out of monism after that period. More specifically, the article defends the view that what made room for ontological pluralism within Leibniz’s rationalist and Platonic outlook was the idea that perception is the property which constitutes the very being of substances: substances are their perceptions. (shrink)

Si Dios es la razón suficiente del mundo, entonces parece seguirse que todos los eventos son consecuencia necesaria de un ser necesario. Para evadir esta conclusión, Leibniz formula en la década de 1670 una concepción modal que funda la contingencia en un rasgo lógico e intrínseco de las ideas de las cosas: la posibilidad de concebir la idea contraria sin contradicción. Hacia 1686, Leibniz complementa esta primera concepción con lo que considera su solución definitiva al problema de la contingencia: la (...) teoría del análisis infinito. Sin embargo, en otros escritos de ese año, propone dos vías alternativas de fundamentación de la contingencia. Este trabajo sugiere que esa pluralidad de modelos explicativos converge en una concepción integral de las modalidades que subyace como trasfondo de la reflexión modal leibniziana. If God is the sufficient reason for this world, then it seems to follow that every event is a necessary consequence of a necessary being. in order to avoid this conclusion, Leibniz states, during the 1670's, a modal conception that grounds contingency on a logical feature which is intrinsic to the ideas of things: the possibility of conceiving the opposite idea without contradiction. Towards 1686, Leibniz complements this first conception with what he considered to be his definitive solution to the problem of contingency: the theory of infinite analysis. However, in other writings from the same year, he proposes two different ways to explain contingency. This paper suggests that this plurality of models converges in a global conception of modalities, which lies at the background of Leibniz's modal thought. (shrink)

In this article I discuss two questions with relation to Spinoza’s Christology. The first question is: how can we bring Spinoza’s thesis of the separation of theology and philosophy in agreement with his understanding of Christ as a philosophical figure in a book of revelation, the Bible? The second question is: how must we interpret Spinoza’s faith in Christ as a person, who has adequately understood the central message of prophetic revelation, a message of salvation through good works? The first (...) question is discussed by means of a comparison between Maimonides’ prophetology in The Guide of the Perplexed on the one hand and Spinoza’s prophetology and christology in the Theological Political Treatise on the other hand. I show that Spinoza’s figure of Christ has the same kinds of knowledge as Maimonides’ prophet. A difference between Spinoza’s Christ and Maimonides’ prophet is that the first has no political ambitions while the last is – especially in the person of Mozes – evidently a political figure. The second question is discussed by an investigation of Spinoza’s conception of the subject of incarnation in his correspondence with Henry Oldenburg. It is argued that Spinoza understands incarnation as an expression of God’s wisdom in all things. Incarnation is not an exclusive but an all including principle of divine production of and manifestation in different modes of being. Nevertheless, we can distinguish hierarchies of modes of being. In this respect God’s wisdom is more incarnated in human beings than in non-human modes of being, and among human beings it is most incarnated in Christ. However, the question how Christ as a human being can understand adequately the message of revelation, which cannot be cleared up by philosophical reason, remains unanswered. In the concluding remarks it is argued that Spinoza with his christology tried to build a bridge to the enlightened parts of the christian communities of his time. Moreover, this christology functions for himself as a guarantee that the sphere of revelation and faith is ultimately included in the intuitive knowlegde sub specie aeternitatis. So the thesis of separation of faith and reason can only be understood as provisional. (shrink)

El artículo indaga en dos tradiciones filosóficas, la primera enfatiza la importancia de la voluntad y la segunda prefiere el entendimiento. Estas opciones antropológicas son decisivas para explicar otras cuestiones, y tiene también muchas consecuencias prácticas. Después de una exposición genealógica, estudiamos los casos de Leibniz y Spinoza porque unifican ambas dimensiones pero de manera distinta.

O presente artigo examina o modo como Leibniz figurou as relações entre o pensa- mento filosófico e o pensamento místico, recorrendo para isso ao contraste entre suas teses e as de Spinoza. Trata-se de mostrar que a transcendência do fundamento da racionalidade levará Leibniz, de forma à primeira vista surpreendente, a uma valorização da totalidade do campo imanente da experiência humana como fonte de conhecimento. O erro do spinozis- mo, segundo Leibniz, consiste justamente em, ao tornar imanente o fundamento, perder (...) de vista a especificidade cognitiva e ética da experiência. (shrink)

Discussions of Leibniz’s view of the relation between God and nature in 1675–1676 has split commentators into two competing camps. According to some scholars, Leibniz was a pantheistic substance monist in these years. However, other scholars think that he was neither a substance monist nor a pantheist. This paper advocates a middle ground between these two interpretations. With scholars in the first camp, it is argued that Leibniz was a substance monist in 1675–1676. However, it is also argued that he (...) was not a pantheistic substance monist, but rather a panentheistic one. This interpretation has at least a twofold virtue vis-à-vis the anti-monistic and pantheistic readings. For one thing, unlike the anti-monistic reading, the panentheistic interpretation is in keeping with the weight of textual evidence, which strongly indicates that in 1675–1676 Leibniz did embrace, and actually argue for, the idea that God is the only substance. For another, unlike the pantheist interpretation, it can accommodate the fact that, while endorsing monism in 1675–1676, Leibniz at the same time rejected necessitarianism. (shrink)