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On the property structure of realist collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics and the so-called "counting anomaly"

Roman Frigg

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):43 – 57 (2003)

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(1 other version)Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent?Lefteris Farmakis - 2009 - Theoria 23 (2):163-173.details Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar, who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs’s approach and then take (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Interpreting spontaneous collapse theories.Peter J. Lewis - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (1):165-180.details Spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics require an interpretation if their claim to solve the measurement problem is to be vindicated. The most straightforward interpretation rule, the fuzzy link, generates a violation of common sense known as the counting anomaly. Recently, a consensus has developed that the mass density link provides an appropriate interpretation of spontaneous collapse theories that avoids the counting anomaly. In this paper, I argue that the mass density link violates common sense in just as striking a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Probability in GRW theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.details GRW Theory postulates a stochastic mechanism assuring that every so often the wave function of a quantum system is `hit', which leaves it in a localised state. How are we to interpret the probabilities built into this mechanism? GRW theory is a firmly realist proposal and it is therefore clear that these probabilities are objective probabilities (i.e. chances). A discussion of the major theories of chance leads us to the conclusion that GRW probabilities can be understood only as either single (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 27 citations
GRW: A case study in quantum ontology.Peter J. Lewis - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):224–244.details This article provides an overview of the philosophical literature on the GRW theory of quantum mechanics, and argues for a particular position regarding that literature. Much of the literature is ontological; it attempts to defend a conception of what the world is like according to the GRW theory against perceived competitors. I argue that there is no real debate here, since these supposedly conflicting positions are better regarded as alternative and compatible ways of describing the world of the GRW theory. Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations
The problem of ontology for spontaneous collapse theories.Bradley Monton - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (3):407-421.details The question of how to interpret spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics is an open one. One issue involves what link one should use to go from wave function talk to talk of ordinary macroscopic objects. Another issue involves whether that link should be taken ontologically seriously. In this paper, I ague that the link should be taken ontologically seriously; I argue against an ontology consisting solely of the wave function. I then consider three possible links: the fuzzy link, the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 30 citations
Four strategies for dealing with the counting anomaly in spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics.Peter J. Lewis - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):137 – 142.details A few years ago, I argued that according to spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics, arithmetic applies to macroscopic objects only as an approximation. Several authors have written articles defending spontaneous collapse theories against this charge, including Bassi and Ghirardi, Clifton and Monton, and now Frigg. The arguments of these authors are all different and all ingenious, but in the end I think that none of them succeeds, for reasons I elaborate here. I suggest a fourth line of response, based (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations

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