The aim of this paper is to show that, for the purposes of addressing the epistemic aspects of systemic injustice, we need a notion of emancipatory attention. When the epistemic and ethical elements of an injustice are intertwined, it is a misleading idealisation to think of these epistemological elements as calling for the promotion of knowledge through a rational dialectic. Taking them to instead call for a campaign of consciousness-raising runs into difficulties of its own, when negotiating the twin risks (...) of being presumptuous about one’s own ignorance, and patronising in attributing ignorance to others. To arrive at a better response, we should follow Marilyn Frye’s suggestion that the epistemic aspects of injustice are, at root, problems of attention. But we fail to give an adequate account of this if we adhere to the most influential tradition of thinking about attention’s ethics, which takes its lead from Iris Murdoch’s reading of Simone Weil. That tradition addresses attention’s significance in individual contexts, rather than social ones. To get a better conception of the role that is played by attention in projects of social emancipation, we should take some ideas from recent work on the metaphysics of attention, together with ideas from an older tradition – represented here by R.G. Collingwood’s The Principles of Art – concerning the forms of attention that are occasioned by the creation and appreciation of art. (shrink)