It has become apparent that the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists has come to a stalemate. Neither view can reasonably claim to be the most rational philosophy of science, exclusively capable of making sense of all scientific activities. On one prominent analysis of the situation, whether we accept a realist or an anti-realist account of science actually seems to depend on which values we antecedently accept, rather than our commitment to “rationality” per se. Accordingly, several philosophers have attempted (...) to argue in favour of scientific realism or constructive empiricism by showing that one set of values is exclusively best, for anyone and everyone, and that the downstream choice of the philosophy of science which best serves those values is therefore best, for anyone and everyone. These efforts, however, seem to have failed. In response, I suggest that philosophers of science should suspend the effort to determine which philosophy of science is best for everyone, and instead begin investigating which philosophy of science is best for specific people, with specific values, in specific contexts. I illustrate how this might be done by briefly sketching a single case study from the history of science, which seems to show that different philosophies of science are better at motivating different forms of scientific practice. (shrink)

The development of new e-culture becomes one of the most important phenomena of the digital age. The concept ‘e-culture’ has been still developing; though it is evident, that as a phenomenon, it cannot be compared with anything that has ever existed. It requires the necessity of its deep study in general and in terms of axiological and ethical aspects, reflecting the nature of its influence on human world view and behaviour. The author offers the concept of e-culture as a new (...) type of creative activity, the ‘third nature’, progressively replacing ‘living culture’ and natural environment for human beings. Digital culture gives human beings new ways to solve existential problems (death and desolation; not liberty and ethical choice), forming in this regard new dependences and risks for biosocioelectronical subjects developing within its conditions. First of all, internet-dependence refers to such risks. It enhances ‘existential vacuum’, axiological disorientation in the real sphere; deformation of interpersonal communication essence with the virtualization of its sensual and emotional aspects; appearance of new freedom forms of personality ethical choice, generated by virtual interaction. An existential approach to the understanding of e-culture allows us to determine the relation between deep ontological personality problems and new technology achievements of the digital age. (shrink)

Illusions of control and fantasies of power are important themes in human history and culture. The first objective of this paper is to explore Zarathustran fantasies in the information society, and our dreams of God-like control and mastery over ourselves and the Universe. This paper does not try to be faithful to Nietzschean philosophical concepts of Zarathustra, but instead explore cultural themes, which can be related to a mythology of God-like control and omniscient perception. It draws together strands from science (...) fiction, anthropology, philosophy, technology development, systems engineering, socio-technical systems, finance and e-business to set out how we have fallen for the technocultural illusions we have created. The paper then shifts gear, and in an attempt to address these technocultural problems, identifies an intellectual trajectory centred on an anthropological perspective. Using examples from e-business and Schwartz’s universal model of human values, applied into a technocultural context, the paper shows how it is possible to create meaningful systems of organisation that utilise advanced technologies to help provide a deeply value-laden cultural system. Our world is changing fundamentally and dramatically, and we desperately need new approaches to help us understand these transitions. The paper’s primary contribution is to critique both human-centred thinking, and mechanistic, Taylorist views of organisation and technology. It stimulates debate concerning the relationship between technology and culture as it is worked out in the information society. Shifting the perspective from humans as social, functioning creatures, this paper offers a new human-centred approach based upon humans as cultural, valuing beings. (shrink)