Friedrich Hölderlin argued that consciousness requires division and unity. Consciousness emerges through the fundamental distancing of the subject from its surroundings, without which the subject-object distinction would collapse and both objectivity and consciousness would be lost. Nevertheless, insofar as conscious knowledge is unitary, division demands a ground for unity. Hölderlin calls this ground ‘Being [Seyn].’ However, once Being is affirmed, the question of how it is accessed arises. Hölderlin’s scholars disagreed on this issue. This disagreement gave rise to two camps: (...) those who deny that Hölderlin accepts the idea of direct access to Being and believe that he proves Being through an act of reflection (Henrich); and those who argue that for Hölderlin, ‘Being’ is directly accessed. Those who hold the latter position can be further divided into those who conceive of this direct access as knowledge (Frank) and those who argue that this access does not have a cognoscitive character, but rather an aesthetic one (Waibel). This article considers these positions and shows that the direct apprehension of ‘Being’ is part of Hölderlin’s argument aimed at solving a fundamental problem; an argument that differs both from the postulate of access to Being as knowledge of transcendence and from the affirmation of a purely aesthetic mode of access. (shrink)

Le manuscrit de Hegel découvert en 1917 et connu comme « le plus ancien programme systématique de l'idéalisme allemand » est considéré comme un texte emblématique pour le processus de genèse de l’idéalisme allemand. Bien qu’il adopte la langue de Kant et la « révolution copernicienne » que ce dernier avait apportée en fondant la philosophie sur le sujet pensant, ce texte formule des questions qui avaient été laissées sans réponse par le kantisme, en demandant qu’elles soient reposées dans le (...) cadre d’un nouveau fondement, systématique, de la philosophie. Le système que trace Hegel culmine avec l’idée suprême, l’idée du Beau, dans laquelle « la Vérité et la Bonté s’allient ». Le sens esthétique est érigé en « instrument » philosophique fondamental, indispensable à l’acte esthétique « suprême » par lequel la Raison conçoit et « englobe toutes les idées ». L’élément esthétique est également nécessaire à la nouvelle Volksreligion proclamée par le projet utopique hégélien. Enfin, en dépit des références kantiennes indubitables, l’ambition profonde du texte reste le dépassement d’un questionnement transcendantal orienté vers la conscience et son remplacement par un désir d’origine romantique de dépassement de toute dichotomie et d’atteindre l’union avec l’absolu. (shrink)

For Friedrich Hölderlin, the mediatory role of aesthetics was central to overcoming the challenges of modern life, in particular human beings’ antagonistic relationship to nature. This article claims that Hölderlin preserves and improves what is true in Kant’s conception of the beautiful: that the experience of beauty concerns recognizing our dependence on nature, and that this recognition resonates in the works of artistic geniality as well. The article furthermore argues that the twentieth-century philosopher Theodor W. Adorno’s interpretation of Hölderlin sheds (...) light on how Hölderlin’s late poetry constitutes a remembrance of nature that avoids fetishizing nature as an origin to which we should return, while still allowing for an acknowledgment of its priority. Hölderlin’s poetry, as a work of spirit or mind, is exemplary in its commemoration of the precondition for spirit’s achievements: finite, empirical life. In this way, the self-reflectivity of Hölderlin’s poems also constitute a corrective to subjectivist tendencies that still reverberate in post-Kantian idealism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article reevaluates Hölderlin’s social and political thought in the 1790s. Against Georg Lukács, it argues that Hölderlin’s politics of the new mythology, while utopian, are not mystical. In the Fragment of Philosophical Letters and the Oldest System-Programme of German Idealism, Hölderlin instead articulates two fundamental claims. Socially, the new mythical collectivity must elevate (erheben) the social relations produced by bourgeois society, exalting them in aesthetic-religious form, rather than sublating (aufheben) them, modifying both their form and their content. Politically, (...) realizing this new collectivity requires transcending the state, and so is essentially revolutionary. Hölderlin’s prosaic writings thus supplement Hyperion’s romantic critique of modernity. They take as their point of departure a sober exposition of the social relations of the market emerging in Hölderlin’s time and, from within these relations, excavate a new mythical collectivity capable of suturing the fragmentary divisions of modern life. (shrink)