In an important and widely discussed series of studies, Jonathan Phillips and colleagues have suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness has a substantial moral component. For in- stance, two persons who enjoy the same extent of positive emotions and are equally satisfied with their lives are judged as happy to different degrees if one is less moral than the other. Considering that the relation between morality and happiness or self-interest has been one of the central questions of moral philosophy (...) since at least Plato, such a result would be of considerable philosophical interest. On closer examination of the original research and new studies, we suggest that the data point to a different conclusion: in the dominant folk understanding of happiness, morality has no fundamental role. Findings seeming to indicate a moralized concept are better explained, we suggest, by folk theories on which extreme moral turpitude indicates that an individual suffers from psychological dysfunction. (shrink)

In recent years the study of well-being has attracted considerable attention, fostering hope that the scientific community will ultimately succeed in discovering its very nature, thereby emulating successful scientific projects in other disciplines. However, there have been recurring worries about how to measure and define well-being. In this context, Hersch (Br J Philos Sci 73:1045–1065, 2022) has recently argued that we could progressively alleviate these worries through an iterative dialogue between theory and measurement, by seeing them as stemming from a (...) coordination problem. In this article, I argue that the concept of well-being fails to meet the prerequisites for Hersch’s approach. If the latter is the best defense of the capacity of science to uncover the nature of well-being, it follows that the science of well-being should probably relinquish this ambition. (shrink)

Can a moral monster - a person whose life is characterised by immoral actions - live a meaningful life? Pre-theoretical intuitions appear divided. For some, moral monsters can't live a meaningful life because they were immoral, while for others they did because morality is irrelevant. So what is the relationship between morality and meaning? This article contends that both sides are partially correct but for the wrong reasons: moral monsters don’t live meaningful lives, but morality is irrelevant for meaning. First, (...) it is argued moral monsters live meaningless lives not because of immoral actions per se, but rather the harm they cause. Second, that moral monsters can live meaningful lives confuses meaningfulness with significance. Significance, I propose, is conferred upon a life when one's actions impact others' well-being for good or ill. On the view, moral monsters live meaningless but significant lives. (shrink)

Devotion is associated with showing commitment to what individuals choose. But is perceived devotion influenced by how individuals react to what they did not choose? Two experiments (N = 1,000) indicate that rejecting alternatives is a key behavioral cue for assessing devotion. Study 1 documents the basic effect: individuals who reject alternatives were seen as more devoted than individuals who accept or are ambiguous toward alternatives. The result remained regardless of whether individuals self-identified with being devoted and exerted effort toward (...) their target of devotion. Rejecting alternatives predicted greater likelihood of being trusted and viewed as living a good life, mediated by perceived devotion. Study 2 examined whether people distinguish between different types of devotees who reject alternatives, in terms of the process (mindful vs. mindless) and nature (neutral vs. harmful to the self) of their choices. Individuals who engaged in harmful devotion were less likely to be perceived as devoted, trusted, or living a good life than individuals who did not. Individuals who mindlessly rejected alternatives were also evaluated more negatively than individuals who mindfully rejected alternatives. Altogether, these findings not only illuminate how rejecting alternatives inform our understanding of devotion but also reveal its broader impact on social evaluations. (shrink)