Roth's analysis of the Rationalitätstreit (i.e., the debate(s) about rationality) stands as one of the major works on how the debate affects a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science and the social sciences. His principal thesis is that the debate may be seen as a series of Quine-type "translation manuals," exhibiting characteristics of paradigms (following Kuhn 1970) that can be treated as testable scientific theories by adequate empirical tests. The author argues that Roth's notion of empirically testing (...) translation manuals is not possible given his criteria. He suggests a clearer definition of "methods" and develops a case whereby translation manuals can be adequately tested within an inductive model-but with rather severe restrictions. Implications are indicated. (shrink)

Wisdom: its nature, origins and development Robert J. Sternberg, Ed., 1990 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 339 pp.Does Science Compute? Computational Models of Scientific Discovery and Theory Formation Jeff Shrager & Pat Langley, Eds. 1990 San Mateo, CA, Morgan Kaufman Publishers xi +498 pp.Arguing and Thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology Michael Billig, 1987 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 290 pp.The Absent Body Drew Leder, 1990 Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. x+218 pp., US$34.95 hardback, US $14.95 paperback.

The ArgumentIn the controversy in 1989 over the reported achievement of cold nuclear fusion, parts of the physics and chemistry communities were opposed in both a theoretic and a professional competition. Physicists saw the chemists' announcement as an incursion into territory allocated to their own discipline and strove to restore the interdisciplinary boundaries that had previously held. The events that followed throw light on the manner in which scientists' knowledge claims and metascientific beliefs are affected by their membership of disciplinary (...) communities. In particular, the controversy offers evidence for a constructivist reinterpretation of the “division of nature into levels,” which is customarily held to underpin the division of science into disciplines. (shrink)

Remedios and Dusek have provided a useful contextualization of Steve Fuller’s recent work in social epistemology. While they have provided some good criticisms of some of Fuller’s new ideas, they fail to provide a systematic critique of Fuller’s retreat from a naturalistic and materialist social epistemology for one embracing transhumanism, intelligent design, and the proactionary imperative. An alternative approach is developed, drawing on Fuller’s early work and incorporating recent work on our biological and cultural evolution as a species.

This paper consists of three sections. In the first one, some of the main developments in the philosophy of science through the xx century up to the present will be pointed out, and inserted them in the frame of some more general philosophical transformations, such as the so-called “linguistic turn” and “pragmatic turn”, respectively. In the second one, the established connection will be nuanced, from a revision of the work of a “classical” author such as Carnap. Finally, it will be (...) intended a kind of “balance and future perspectives”. (shrink)

This article aims at a critical reevaluation of the trading zone concept. It starts from a case study of the Faraday–Whewell collaboration in coming to terms with electrolysis experiments. The case is supposed to be an example of a trade zone of science/philosophy interaction though it demonstrates the unequal nature of the “trade.” This requires the analysis to log in some details concerning Galison’s metaphor of trading zones, which reveals its market-oriented connotations. The following criticism of the market metaphor for (...) science applies a revised version of Boris Hessen’s argument against misinterpretation of technology by some British scientists. A closer look at the ancient trade rituals in Marcel Mauss’ seminal work enables discovering another cultural pattern for describing scientific communication as opposed to trade—gift. This helps picture science as a distribution of social roles and statuses and uncovers the normative and value dimension of gift zones language. (shrink)

This paper discusses the tenets of the politics of postmodern philosophy of science. At issue are Rouse's version of naturalism and his reading of Quine's distinction between the indeterminacy of translation and the underdetermination of theories by empirical evidence. I argue that the postmodern approach to science's research practices as patterns of interaction within the world is not in line with the naturalistic account Rouse aims at. I focus also on Rouse's readings of Heidegger's existential conception of science and Kuhn's (...) concept of normal science. Finally, a strategy of defending science's cognitive distinctiveness in terms of hermeneutic philosophy is suggested as an alternative to the postmodern philosophy of science. (shrink)

Just as political theorists have long argued that democracy is viable only in communities of certain sizes and shapes, perhaps epistemologists should also entertain the idea that knowledge is possible only within certain social parameters-ones which today's world may have exceeded. This is what I mean by the "postepistemic" society. I understand an "epistemic society" in Popperian terms as an environment that fosters the spirit of conjectures and refutations. After castigating analytic philosophers for their failure to see this point, I (...) show how Rousseau and Feyerabend occupy analogous positions as critics of, respectively, the nation-state and Big Science. Rather than endorsing the disestablishment of the state, however, I offer a proposal for reinjecting the critical attitude into Big Science. It involves heightening the sporting character of scientific disputes, perhaps even to the point of enabling the public to bet on their outcomes. (shrink)

Philip Tetlock underestimates the import of his own Expert Political Judgment. It is much more than a critical scientific evaluation of the accuracy and consistency of political pundits. It also offers a blueprint for challenging expertise more generally-in the name of scientific advancement. “Thinking the unthinkable”-a strategy Tetlock employs when he gets experts to consider counterfactual scenarios that are far from their epistemic comfort zones-has had explosive consequences historically for both knowledge and morality by extending our sense of what is (...) possible. Thinking the unthinkable might also put into question contemporary assumptions about the legitimacy of science. (shrink)

An assessment of Joel Isaac’s recent, well-researched attempt to provide a context for the emergence of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. That context consisted in the open space for cross-disciplinary projects between the natural and social sciences that existed at Harvard during the presidency of James Bryant Conant, from the early 1930s to the early 1950s. Isaac’s work at the Harvard archives adds interesting detail to a story whose general contours are already known. In particular, he reinforces the view (...) that the guiding intellectual presence of what Isaac dubs Harvard’s “interstitial academy” was the biochemist Lawrence Henderson, someone who was enamored of Vilfredo Pareto’s version of scientism and was materially supported by the Rockefeller Foundation’s interest in increasing worker productivity. Isaac fails to consider the normative implications of Henderson’s vision, which influenced Talcott Parsons even more deeply than Kuhn. Isaac’s book is read in light of this concern, which reveals a profound sense of what is required of the sort of future elite policy maker that Harvard hoped to train: namely, a systems-based orientation that is at the same time tolerant of considerable intrasystemic incommensurability. The epistemological and ethical aspects of this prescription are analyzed. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

The ArgumentI argue that “social epistemology” can be usefully reformulated as a philosophy of science accounting, specifically one that fosters a critical form of instrumental rationality. I begin by observing that philosophical and sociological species of “science accountancy” can be compared along two dimensions; constructive versus deconstve; reflexive versus unreflexive. The social epistemologist proposes a constructive and reflixive accounting for science. This possibility has been obscured, probably because of the persuasiveness of the Frankfulrt School's portrayal of “critical” and “instrumental” rationalities (...) as polar opposites. In challenging this polarity, I present four “acciybtability conditions” that define pure critico-instrumental rationality. These conditions are most likely to be met during a period of“crisis” in the future direction of science. The bulk of the paper concerns case study of such a crisis that enables us to examine contrasting ways of meeting the four conditions. Ernst Mach and Max Planck debated“the end of science” in the first decade of this century, a time marked by both science's increasing involvement in the means of social reproduction and prowing concern that science pursued for its own sake was exhibiting diminishing margianl returns on investment. In analyzing Planck's victory, I conclude that its tegacy has been an ever-widenig gap between the“content” and“function” of scientific knowledge in society, as measured by the increasing numbers of jobs that are devoted to mediating the production and distribution of knowledge. (shrink)

George Reisch documents how the logical positivists adapted to their émigré status in the United States by relinquishing their leftist political ambitions and turning into the analytic philosophy establishment that persists to this day. However, there are also deep-seated tendencies in US intellectual history that provide reasons for thinking that the positivists’ progressive projects would never have taken hold—even if the FBI were not keeping the positivists under surveillance. These tendencies are manifested in the striking ineffectuality of US philosophers in (...) public life. Key Words: Cold War • logical positivism • pragmatism • university • anti-intellectualism • philosophy of science. (shrink)

I respond to Rupert Read's highly critical review of my Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul Science . In contrast to my pro-Popper take on the debate, Read promotes a Wittgenstein-inflected Kuhn, whom I dub "Kuhnenstein." Kuhnenstein is largely the figment of Read's—and others'—fertile philosophical imagination as channeled through scholastic philosophical practice. Contra Read, I argue that Kuhnenstein provides not only a poor basis for social epistemology but Kuhnenstein's prominence itself exemplifies a poor social epistemology for philosophy. Nevertheless, (...) like Read, I wish to speak in favor of amateurism in philosophy; for me, the exemplar is the dialectical Popper rather than the gnomic and dogmatic Kuhnenstein. Key Words: Kuhnenstein • social epistemology • Kuhn • Popper • Wittgenstein • skepticism • language therapy • amateurism. (shrink)

In this article, the author focuses on Philip Kitcher's and Alvin Goldman's economic models of the social character of scientific knowledge production. After introducing some relevant methodological issues in the social sciences and characterizing Kitcher's and Goldman's models, the author goes on to show that special problems arise directly from the concept of an agent invoked in the models. The author argues that the two distinct concepts of agents, borrowed from economics and cognitive psychology, are inconsistent. Finally, the author discusses (...) some of the normative implications that arise from adopting economic concepts of agents in the study of science. (shrink)

Context: The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are “wicked problems,” such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem: The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science in domains (...) where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method: We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results: The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications: The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Constructivist content: Our perspectivist approach to science is based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll and Peirce. (shrink)

Durkheim’s epistemology, the argument for the social origins of the categories of the understanding, is his most important and most neglected argument. This argument has been confused with his sociology of knowledge and Durkheim’s overall position has been misunderstood as a consequence. This lead to the argument that there are two Durkheims: a functionalist positivist and an idealist. The current popularity of a “cultural" or “ideological” interpretation of Durkheim is as much a misunderstanding of his position as the “functional" interpretation (...) from which the current interpretations seek to rescue him. Durkheim articulated a sophisticated epistemology in the classical sense, a point that has been entirely missed. The argument, which is articulated mainly in the central chapters of “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life”, locates the origin of the fundamental categories of thought in the concrete empirical details of enacted practices. For social constructivists, social consensus, structure, or shared practices lead persons to believe certain things or think in certain ways. Because persons share the same beliefs, they act in ways that reinforce those beliefs. For Durkheim, however, the genesis of the categories of the understanding in enacted practice solved the problem of indeterminacy. (shrink)