À partir de l’analyse d’un passage du Contre les géomètres de Sextus Empiricus, cet article tente d’évaluer la signification réelle ainsi que les con­séquences épistémiques de la destruction épicurienne des objets de la géométrie. L’existence du clinamen ainsi que le schème explicatif des explications multiples sont interprétés comme des résultats positifs du refus par Épicure de toute géo­métrisation de la nature.

While Aristotle provides the crucial testimonies for the paradoxes of motion, topos, and the falling millet seed, surprisingly he shows almost no interest in the paradoxes of plurality. For Plato, by contrast, the plurality paradoxes seem to be the central paradoxes of Zeno and Simplicius is our primary source for those. This paper investigates why the plurality paradoxes are not examined by Aristotle and argues that a close look at the context in which Aristotle discusses Zeno holds the answer to (...) this question. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an original view of the structure of space—called infinitesimal atomism—as a reply to Zeno’s paradox of measure. According to this view, space is composed of ultimate parts with infinitesimal size, where infinitesimals are understood within the framework of Robinson’s nonstandard analysis. Notably, this view satisfies a version of additivity: for every region that has a size, its size is the sum of the sizes of its disjoint parts. In particular, the size of a finite region (...) is the sum of the sizes of its infinitesimal parts. Although this view is a coherent approach to Zeno’s paradox and is preferable to Skyrms’s infinitesimal approach, it faces both the main problem for the standard view and the main problem for finite atomism, leaving it with no clear advantage over these familiar alternatives. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus ascribes to Epicurus a curious account of truth and falsehood, according to which these characteristics belong to things in the world about which one speaks, not to what one says about them. I propose an interpretation that takes this account seriously and explains the connection between truth and existence that the Epicureans also seem to recognise. I then examine a second Epicurean account of truth and falsehood and show how it is related to the first.

Introduction“What reason is there to suppose that those who did know Parmenides’ poem necessarily thought that he had raised a real problem which they must try to deal with? Empedocles, perhaps also Anaxagoras, knew the poem, but they pursue a very different kind of philosophy from Zeno and Melissus: why, then, must we suppose that they are seeking an alternative answer to the problem posed by Parmenides, and that their ultimate material elements are to be seen as modifications of the (...) Eleatic ἓν έόν?“These rhetorical questions, taken from M. L. West's recent book,Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient,make a useful starting point for this inquiry. They are, of course, what the grammar books call “repudiating questions“: the answer hoped for is “no reason“. The argument with which Mr. West goes on to support his negative implication is not likely to convince many students of the Presocratics. He determinedly makes light of Parmenides’ chains of argument, apparently on the ground that “these were not the actual stages of Parmenides’ thinking” — as if Parmenides ought to have been writing his intellectual autobiography instead of a philosophical argument. (shrink)

In this paper, we address an infamous argument against divisibility that dates back to Zeno. There has been an incredible amount of discussion on how to understand the critical notions of divisibility, extension, and infinite divisibility that are crucial for the very formulation of the argument. The paper provides new and rigorous definitions of those notions using the formal theories of parthood and location. Also, it provides a new solution to the paradox of divisibility which does not face some threats (...) that can possibly undermine the standard Lebesgue measure solution to such a paradox. (shrink)

One of the most widely accepted emendations in Lucretius has been the change by Lambinus in 2.289 of the manuscript reading res to mens. For instance, of the major editors since Lachmann only Bockemüller, Merrill in his 1917 edition, and Martin in his Teubner editions have printed res. Also, few emendations in Lucretius are of equal significance for Epicurean doctrine because, as will be shown, some conclusions of important recent scholarship depend on the acceptance of the reading mens.

Au livre XXV du Peri physeos, épicure met en œuvre une critique de Démocrite, l’accusant de s’ignorer lui-même et de soutenir une doctrine qui entre en contradiction avec ses actes. Pour Épicure, l’existence même de l’éloge et du blâme signifie que l’homme doit être considéré comme assumant, au moins partiellement, la responsabilité de son caractère acquis, de ses pensées et de ses actes. Le livre XXV du Peri physeos, pourtant, loin de prendre ses distances vis-à-vis de l’éthique de Démocrite, doit (...) être considéré comme un retour aux sources démocritéennes par Épicure et ce, par-delà les successeurs de Démocrite. L’étude des fragments et témoignages concernant Démocrite suggère en effet qu’il soutenait à la fois la thèse d’une constitution de l’âme exclusivement atomistique et la possibilité d’une transformation de l’âme par l’homme. On peut en conclure que ce n’est pas tant la perspective démocritéenne que rejette Épicure que la radicalisation déterministe effectuée par les démocritéens de la deuxième ou troisième génération. L’enjeu est donc pour Épicure, en restant fidèle à la physique et à l’éthique démocritéennes originelles, d’apporter des éléments qui permettent de justifier leur compatibilité au sein d’un même système, ce que Démocrite avait sans doute omis de faire. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the equivalent of Epicurus’ πρόληψις, the second criterion of the Epicurean Canonic (DL X 31 = fr. 35 Usener), in Lucretius’ De rerum natura (DRN). Taking stock of the several occurrences of the Latin terms notitia and notities in the six books of the poem, I show that Lucretius’ view about preconception remains faithful to Epicurus’ πρόληψις, and that the poet does not endorse a less empiricist position than his Master because of some influence of (...) the Stoic ἔννοια. To this end, I will also briefly address an important case in which πρόληψις, albeit not clearly mentioned, plays an essential role, namely the prolepsis of the deity (DRN V 1169–1182). Finally, I explain how Lucretius can be of some help in grasping the controversial relationship between the criterion of πρόληψις and that of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας (animi inectus/iactus), showing in which way the poet seems to consider the latter as a criterion of truth in its own right. (shrink)

This paper examines Hume’s comments on and claims about ancient philosophy. A clear and consistent picture emerges from doing so. While Hume is a lover of ancient literature, he holds ancient philosophy in very low regard, as passage after passage discloses, with one qualification and one important exception. Hume appropriates the mantle of ‘Academic’ sceptic for himself; but in fact his Academic (or ‘mitigated’) scepticism has only minimal affinity with the ancient school of this name, having more in common with (...) early modern sceptical positions. The exception is found in the ‘painterly’ depictions of character and other features of moral life, where Hume holds many of the ancients in very high regard, seeing them as superior to the moderns. The bases of these respective views of Hume’s are explored, with an interpretation which construes Hume’s ‘anatomist’/’painter’ contrast as meant non-ironically. On the anatomist or theoretical side, Hume nonetheless – rightly or wrongly, and contrary to the views of a number of his prominent readers – sees a radical, dramatic break between early modern ‘scientific’ philosophy, and anything which preceded it. (shrink)

L’objectif de cette étude est d’examiner l’hypothèse selon laquelle la quarta natura, théorisée par Épicure pour rendre compte des activités de l’âme et décrite par Lucrèce (DRN III, 237-244), résulte de l’appropriation par Épicure d’un argument aristotélicien afin de répondre aux critiques d’Aristote à l’égard de la théorie démocritéenne de l’âme. Pour ce faire, on analysera le témoignage de Cicéron (Tusc. I, 10, 22) sur le quintum genus attribué à Aristote et on rendra compte des débats sur ses sources possibles. (...) En confrontant le témoignage cicéronien avec les vers dans lesquels Lucrèce expose la théorie de la quatrième nature, on montrera les fortes ressemblances entre leurs structures argumentatives. Sur la base de la possible datation de la théorie de la quintessence et de son attribution au Péripatos du iie siècle av. J-C, on proposera d’expliquer cette similarité par l’appropriation par Lucrèce de l’argument par soustraction qui caractérise la théorie de la quintessence, à partir de laquelle il aurait conçu la théorie de la quatrième nature. Afin de vérifier l’exactitude de cette interprétation, on examinera l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’appropriation de cet argument, et donc la conception de la quatrième nature, remontent à Épicure, la paternité de l’argument par soustraction (à partir duquel les péripatéticiens postérieurs pourraient avoir conçu la théorie de la quintessence) étant alors à attribuer à Aristote. Pour ce faire, on analysera un passage du De Caelo (269a30-269b2) et un passage de La Génération des animaux (736b29-737a1) où l’argument par soustraction sert à introduire d’une part l’éther et d’autre par le pneuma. Ensuite, en s’appuyant sur l’analyse d’un passage du De Anima (405a5-7), on montrera que l’appropriation de cet argument pourrait s’expliquer par la tentative, de la part d’Épicure, de répondre à une critique aristotélicienne concernant la théorie démocritéenne de l’âme. (shrink)

Záměr zkoumat metafyziku stoické filosofické školy naráží na řadu problémů. Předně se metafyzikou zabývali zejména nejstarší stoičtí filosofové, především Zénón, Chrýsippos a Kleanthés, ovšem bohužel právě od nich se plně nedochoval žádný spis a tak o jejich filosofických postojích získáváme informace z druhotných zdrojů, jejichž autoři měli často ke stoické filosofii odmítavý postoj. Zároveň se názory těchto myslitelů v určitých bodech rozcházely a stoická filosofie sama procházela vývojem a proměnami, které zprostředkovány jen druhotnými zdroji působí značné interpretační potíže. Přes tyto (...) obtíže se v tomto textu pokoušíme podat přehled základní struktury stoické metafyziky, tak jak se v tomto nejstarším období zformovala, přičemž poukazujeme na některé problémové či sporné otázky. Východiskem je pro naši analýzu pojem tělesa, od něhož docházíme k rekonstrukci třístupňové stoické metafyziky a nejuniverzálnější kategorie „něco“. Následně se věnujeme činnému a trpnému principu tělesnosti a od nich se odvíjejícího metafyzického systému. (shrink)

RésuméL'atomisme dukalāms'est constitué en opposition à la philosophie naturelle aristotélicienne desfalāsifa. Dans laPhysiqueduShifā', Avicenne s'en est livré à une réfutation détaillée et fondée sur de nombreux arguments. Ces derniers ont donné lieu à une réponse fort discrète chez al-Ghazālī, dont l'obédience aukalāmétait au mieux évanescente. Une réponse plus développée semble avoir été le fait d'al-Shahrastānī, encore qu'on n'en puisse retracer que les grandes lignes en raison du manque de sources transmises. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, qui est passé dans son développement intellectuel (...) par une phase avicennienne, donc par une adoption vigoureuse des arguments anti-atomistes d'Avicenne, suivie d'une phrase critique à l'égard de la philosophie du maître, ne se borne pas à fournir une réponse détaillée aux arguments d'Ibn Sīnā, mais construit de nouveaux arguments en faveur de l'atomisme dukalām. (shrink)

Kalām atomism stood in opposition to the Aristotelian natural philosophy of the falāsifa. In the Physics of the Shifā’, Ibn Sīnā undertook a detailed Refutation of kalām Atomism through several arguments. These arguments elicited a muted response from al-Ghazālī, whose commitment to kalām was minimal at best. A more forceful response seems to have been offered by al-Shahrastānī but its details remain sketchy due to the lack of surviving sources. Fakhr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī, whose intellectual development went through a phase of (...) commitment to Avicennism and thereby a vigorous endorsement of Ibn Sīnā’s anti-atomist arguments followed by a phase of a critical engagement with Avicennism, provides a detailed rebuttal to Ibn Sīnā’s arguments in addition to constructing novel arguments in defense of kalām atomism. (shrink)

It is often claimed that in the ancient world character was believed to be something fixed, given at birth and immutable during life. This belief is said to underlie the portrayal of individuals in ancient historiography and biography, particularly in the early Roman Empire; and tc constitute the chief point of difference in psychological assumptions between ancient and modern biography. In this article, I wish to examine the truth of these claims, with particular reference to Plutarch and Tacitus.

In discussing the atomists' theory of vision modern accounts have quite neglected to take into account two sections of Alexander of Aphrodisias on this topic. Nearly identical in length and content, they contain objections to the atomist theory of vision by means of the . In form they consist of a series of questions purporting to contain atomist doctrine. Each question is followed by objections to its subject-matter. Most of the questions contain doctrine known to us already from other sources.

This paper offers a reconstruction of Xenocrates’ theory of indivisibles which would not commit him to the idea of ‘jerky motion’ criticized by Aristotle in Physica VI, yet would perfectly square with Plato’s Timaeus, the basis of Xenocrates’ canon. Relying on Alexander’s, Porphyry’s, and Themistius’s accounts of his theory, as well on a detailed analysis of De lineis insecabilibus, I suggest that Xenocrates’ minima, contrary to what Aristotle implies, are not to be understood as more or less stable particulars, like (...) tiny chunks of matter, moving about or leaping in physical space from point A to point B. Yet Xenocrates’ minima do remain ‘physical’ and ‘corporeal’ in a more Platonic sense of these words, not presupposing any kind of leaping, jumping, or jerking. This explains why Xenocrates associated the sensible realm with one of the three Fates, namely Clotho. (shrink)