In this paper we identify and evaluate arguments for and against offering assisted reproductive technologies , specifically IVF, to HIV discordant couples . The idea of offering ART to HIV discordant couples generates concerns about safety and public health and raises questions such as: what is an acceptable level of risk to offspring and should couples who want this assistance be subject to selection criteria; should they undergo scrutiny about their suitability as parents when those who are able to conceive (...) naturally face no such scrutiny and people with other illnesses are given access to ART? We conclude that offering ART to HIV discordant couples is likely to produce more benefit than harm and violates no ethical principles. Nevertheless, a decision to deny treatment need not constitute unjustified discrimination. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Does genetic relatedness define who is a mother or father and who incurs obligations towards or entitlements over children? While once the answer to this question may have been obvious, advances in reproductive technologies have complicated our understanding of what makes a parent. In a recent publication Bayne and Kolers argue for a pluralistic account of parenthood on the basis that genetic derivation, gestation, extended custody and sometimes intention to parent are sufficient (but not necessary) grounds for parenthood.1 Bayne (...) and Kolers further suggest that definitions of parenthood are underpinned by the assumption that ‘being causally implicated in the creation of a child is the key basis for being its parent’.2 This paper examines the claim that genetic relatedness is sufficient grounds for parenthood based on a causal connection between genetic parents and their offspring. I argue that parental obligations are about moral responsibility and not causal responsibility because we are not morally accountable for every consequence to which we causally contribute. My account includes the conditions generally held to apply to moral responsibility, i.e. freedom and foreseeability. I argue that parental responsibilities are generated whenever the birth of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of voluntary actions. I consider the implications of this account for third parties involved in reproductive technologies. I argue that under some conditions the obligations generated by freely and foreseeably causing a child to exist can be justifiably transferred to others. (shrink)