The political teachings of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt imply fundamental ontological structures that reflect the processes of the genesis, assertion, and destruction of political being. The article investigates similarities and differences between these political projects. The approach applied by the author is marked by a reliance on the theoretical analysis of the Leviathan's frontispiece and by employing the conceptual framework of Giorgio Agamben's Homo sacer project. The application of these theoretical optics helps to evaluate the political significance of the (...) present people (the people composed of living human beings) in Hobbes's and Schmitt's contexts and to detect the notable difference between the two projects. The article highlights that political existence presupposes the total depoliticization of the present people in the framework of Hobbes's philosophy. It is argued that the security of the present people's life becomes an underlying condition for the mentioned construction (and is therefore ontologically significant). The provision of security potentially saves the sovereign's own life and guarantees recognition by the subjects. An investigation of Schmitt's teaching reveals the political significance of the present people. Since - according to Schmitt - political will is understood only in the context of political enmity (the necessary "horizon” of which is armed confrontation), it is concluded that the political significance of the present people is closely associated with its members' readiness to die in the war. Due to the fact that political existence is generated through the decision on the public enemy (in which the present people might be involved via acclamation procedures), the resoluteness toward death that underlies this decision must be considered as the key factor of Carl Schmitt's political ontology. In light of this statement, it is argued that the project of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time could be considered as Carl Schmitt's "unwritten" ontology of the individual being. (shrink)

Hobbes’s account of the individual’s right to resist sovereign authority is nuanced. His allowance for cases in which a sovereign’s command falls outside the terms of the social contract, despite recent reappraisals, cannot rescue him from the accusation that his system is contradictory. It has been suggested that some Hobbesian rights can be transferred whilst others are quarantined, or that it is the institution of law, rather than the particular commands of the sovereign, which Hobbes ultimately upholds. By reconsidering Hobbes’s (...) concept of sovereignty alongside his theory of natural law, I argue that his system remains in tension with itself. Hobbes’s prioritisation of sovereign judgement over that of the individual, when combined with the principles he retains from the natural law tradition, renders his theory of resistance irreconcilable with his position on sovereignty. (shrink)

Hobbes’s theory of authorisation poses numerous puzzles to scholars. The weightiest of these conundrums is a supposed contradiction between chapter 17 of Leviathan, that calls for unconditional submission to the sovereign, and chapter 21, that defends the liberties of the subject. This article offers a fresh perspective on the theory’s consistency, function and addressees. While existing research doubts the theory’s consistency, focuses on its immunisation function and on the subjects as the theory’s main addresses, the paper argues that Hobbes’s theory (...) of authorisation is consistent with the doctrine of the liberty of subjects, and that it serves the dual purpose of immunising the sovereign against criticism and disciplining the sovereign via a counsel of memento mori: A hitherto underexplored element of authorisation theory is a reminder of the mortality of sovereignty directed at the sovereign to convince him to make restricted use of his absolute right to rule. Hobbes’s theory of authorisation can thus be read as part of a complex argumentative strategy for peace, rooted in a ‘liberal absolutism’ which is not as paradoxical as it sounds, and which is reflected in the frontispiece by the friendly smile of the sovereign. (shrink)

RESUMO O texto acalenta a hipótese de que as razões pelas quais Hobbes justifica a desobediência e mesmo a resistência ao soberano possam ser compreendidas a partir da teoria da boa-fé contratual, tal qual apresentada por Rawls em Uma teoria da justiça. ABSTRACT The text raises the hypothesis that the reasons why Hobbes justifies disobedience and even resistance to the sovereign can be understood from the contractual good-faith theory, as presented by Rawls in A Theory of Justice.

Los estudios recientes sobre Hobbes han puesto una gran atención en el uso de las imágenes. Permanece, sin embargo, una objeción seria y factible: se podría argumentar que Hobbes no relaciona su producción de imágenes, ni a su política, ni a su teoría de la percepción y que, por tanto, no tenemos razón para creer que sus imágenes son una aplicación de esta doctrina. El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar que Hobbes de hecho sí vincula — de un modo (...) implícito — la construcción de imágenes y su teoría psicológica al orden político. Primero, el artículo reconstruye la teoría hobbesiana de la percepción y sus implicaciones. Segundo, se muestra que el Leviathan establece encubiertamente el vínculo entre la teoría de las imágenes y las imágenes políticas, incluyendo, por consiguiente, las creadas por el propio Hobbes. Tercero, se muestra que el Leviatán de Hobbes rara vez descubre su rol como dispositivo para ver, para hacer que el lector vea imágenes que él considera necesarias. Finalmente, se discuten las consecuencias de este descubrimiento para nuestra comprensión de Hobbes y de la visualidad y las imágenes en el pensamiento político. (shrink)