This article discusses rationality gaps triggered by self-referential/cyclic choice, the latter being understood as choosing according to a norm that refers to the choosing itself. The Crocodile Paradox is reformulated and analyzed as a game—named CP—whose Nash equilibrium is shown to trigger a cyclic choice and to invite a rationality gap. It is shown that choosing the Nash equilibrium of CP conforms to the principles Wolfgang Spohn and Haim Gaifman introduced to, allegedly, guarantee acyclicity but, in fact, does not prevent (...) self-referential/cyclic choice and rationality gaps. It is shown that CP is a counter-example to Gaifman's solution of the rationality gaps problem. (shrink)

Abstract I analyse the relationship between the Ramsey Test (RT) for the acceptance of indicative conditionals and the so-called problem of decision-instability. In particular, I argue that the situations which allegedly bring about this problem are troublesome just in case the relevant conditionals are evaluated by non-suppositional versions, e.g. causal/evidential, of the test. In contrast, a suppositional RT, by highlighting the metacognitive nature of the evaluation of indicative conditionals, allows an agent to run a simulation of such evaluation, without yet (...) committing her to the acceptance of such conditionals. I conclude that a suppositional interpretation of RT is superior to its nonsuppositional counterparts and by briefly showing that a suppositional RT is compatible with a deliberational decision theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...) be no incompatibility between moral hazard and the Savage framework. This qualifies the incompatibility view, that is ubiquitous in decision theory. Second, in general, moral hazard is not sufficient to overcome the challenges posed by state-dependent utility to the behavioral identification of beliefs. This qualifies the sufficiency view, that is influential in decision theory. These two philosophical conclusions are the main contributions of my paper. (shrink)