There has been the recurrent suspicion that community, harmony, cohesion, and similar relational goods as understood in the African ethical tradition threaten to occlude difference. Often, it has been Western defenders of liberty who have raised the concern that these characteristically sub-Saharan values fail to account adequately for individuality, although some contemporary African thinkers have expressed the same concern. In this chapter, I provide a certain understanding of the sub-Saharan value of communal relationship and demonstrate that it entails a substantial (...) allowance for difference. I aim to show that African thinkers need not appeal to, say, characteristically Euro-American values of authenticity or autonomy to make sense of why individuals should not be pressured to conform to a group’s norms regarding sex and gender. A key illustration involves homosexuality. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a critical map of toleration as it is displayed in contemporary democracy. It does so by presenting three conceptions of toleration to which current practices of toleration can be traced, and, precisely, these are the standard notion, the political conception based on the neutrality principle, and toleration as recognition. The author argues that the latter is the appropriate conception to address the politically relevant issues of toleration arising in pluralistic democracy, while the first is adequate (...) only for social relations. In order to illustrate this argument, she presents a case of a contested and never solved request for a place of worship by the Muslims of Vercelli which represents an example of a very restricted and minimal interpretation of the standard notion, labeled ‘disrespectful tolerance’. The case is meant to show that unacceptable forms of toleration are still practised, and that the standard notion, here interpreted in the most minimal and negative way, is inappropriate for democratic politics. (shrink)

Die Idee der Toleranz führt in unserer liberalen Gesellschaft eine Art Doppelleben. Einerseits gibt es einen breiten öffentlichen Konsens darüber, dass Toleranz eine gute Sache ist. Andererseits haben die begrifflichen und normativen Paradoxien, die dem Toleranzkonzept offenbar inhärent sind, in der politischen Philosophie für Verwirrung gesorgt. In dieser Abhandlung verteidige und spezifiziere ich die Auffassung, dass Toleranz eine Kombination aus Ablehnung und Akzeptanz beinhaltet. Ich fokussiere mich vor allem auf die Akzeptanzkomponente, die bislang vernachlässigt worden ist. Diese Vernachlässigung erklärt einen (...) Großteil der Verwirrung, für die das Konzept der Toleranz gesorgt hat. Wenn wir einsehen, dass Akzeptanz den Verzicht auf besonders grausame oder gemeine Arten der Intervention meint, sollte klar sein, warum Toleranz moralisch geboten ist. Ich schließe mit einigen methodologischen Ausführungen dazu, wie die Toleranzproblematik angegangen werden sollte und wie nicht. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate and importantly different conceptions (...) of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

This paper situates Karl Popper's ‘paradox of tolerance’ as foundation within the context of interrogating multifaceted violent identity politics propagated in contemporary Nigeria. The paper argues that the ‘active’ virtue of tolerance which requires that subjects within the Nigerian polity engage each other in rationally‐driven discourse on issues of dissent does not presume long‐suffering or passive endurance of violence propagated by a side of the dissenting divide. It is thus pertinent that an appropriate intervention by the Nigerian state delineating the (...) limits of tolerance in the face of perennial intolerance and the proliferation of violent identity politics is inevitable. (shrink)

The article considers whether tolerance, in the classical liberal sense, should be promoted in public education. The most substantial counter-argument is that it is problematic to uphold the ?objection condition,? explained below, which is an integral part of classical tolerance, while maintaining tolerance as a virtue. As a response to this, I first discuss an alternative interpretation of tolerance ? ?tolerance as being open-minded, unprejudiced and positive towards difference.? I contend that this understanding is not the preferable one in public (...) education, because it lacks sufficient distinctiveness and threatens to marginalize or exclude the classical concept of tolerance. I instead propose a modified version of classical tolerance to be promoted in public education, whereby permissible objections are restricted so as not to disrespect persons. This version allows, however, for pupils to have a wide range of objections while still being candidates for being called tolerant, with the result that promoting tolerance may clash with other important educational objectives. I argue that promoting tolerance is still needed as part of a robust educational approach to plurality in modern democratic states, but that we must be willing to accept that promoting tolerance sometimes assumes the place of a second-best educational alternative. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate and importantly different conceptions (...) of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

Many people are talking about being in a post-racial era, which implies that we have overcome race and racism. Their argument is based on the fact that manyof the virulent manifestations of racism are not prevalent today. I argue that racism is not seen as prevalent today because the commonplace views of racism fail to capture the more subtle and insidious new forms of racism. I critically examine some of these views and indicate that racism, its forms and manifestations have (...) changed over time. As such, racism may not be manifested in the standard obvious negative behaviors that people know and expect, but instead, it is manifested in even positive behaviors that the commonplace views may not identify as racism. I offer a view of racism that captures the new subtle forms of racism today, which are not as harmful and invidious as the older forms. Simply because the new forms of racism are not as obvious or harmful, this does not mean that racism no longer exists. (shrink)